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Synopsis 
I begin by considering the problem of priority between ought and the other normative forces, 
as these are distinguished by John Broome. Ought is the strongest normative force but what 
kind of priority can it have given our, shall we call it, subservience to the normative 
requirement?  
Secondly I consider the subservience of ought to reasons.  That the agglomerate of pro 
tanto reasons make an ought seems to imply that ought stands in a subservient relation to 
reasons. On one hand you can’t tell someone imperatively to do something without providing 
a reason. We are in some sense not moved by imperatives, at least we ought in some sense not 
to be. Generally we are moved by reasons. Sometimes we stand in relations to experts which 
both motivate and justify us in obeying imperatives, such as when we go to the doctor. This 
provides ground for thinking that ought is related to reasons in the way Broome claims. On 
the other hand the way from reasons to ought places quite a vaguer on the chances for oughts 
in praxis. Oughts thereby rely on our sensitivity to the reasons which explain it or perhaps 
constitute it. And this seems undoubtedly true of our practical reality that oughts do rely on 
our sensitivity to and implementation of them for their place in guiding our actions, but it 
does not however imply that their existence or truth depends upon our sensitivity towards 
them. In praxis oughts seem to be weaker than and subordinate to reasons. Our weighings of 
reasons are limited as to which reasons we see and how much we take them to weigh, and 
how we agglomerate them. Transference from slack to strict normativity would thereby in 
praxis imply relativism or subjectivism. However, Broome objects that the ought of the 
agglomerate of reasons is not strict, at least not in some cases. We therefore have grounds for 
defending the existence of a strict ought which is other than the ought which results from the 
agglomerate of reasons.  
From introducing a distinction between this ought and different kinds of ‘ought’ we 
come to the problem of priority and distinction between different oughts. This problem 
involves not only that some oughts are more important than others but also that they are 
different. Theoreticians such as Philippa Foot, Susan Wolf, and Bernard Williams have all 
attempted to reduce the ‘moral’ ought or raise the other oughts to a level where any priority is 
lost, except perhaps the priority which is provided by us. Our subjective prioritizing replaces 
 
the detachable, normativity of an ought fact with a non-detachable ought along the lines of 
Williams’ practical ought, which “expresses the agent’s recognition of the course of action 
appropriate, all things considered, to the reasons, motives, and constraints that he sees as 
bearing on the situation.”1 Anscombe denies that the strict concept of moral obligation makes 
any sense without the pervasiveness of Hebrew-Christian ethics. I shall attempt to distinguish 
the strict and detachable ought from other uses of ought and I will try to say something in 
favour of its priority. I agree with Harman that ‘The USA ought to bomb Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki’ does not transfer to ‘Hiroshima and Nagasaki ought to be bombed by the USA’. 
The normativity and justification of that concluding ought is therefore relational to the 
deliberation of which it takes place, and is not applicable outside of the deliberation.  
In the end I look further into the relations between can, must and limitations to ought in 
order to say something about freedom and determination. I conclude that the prospects of the 
strict and detachable ought rely on an unrestrained sensitivity to them, which again implies 
that we balance our subservience to established laws and conventions and our subservience to 
the normative requirement with a heightened use of our imagination or whatever will provide 
both unmediated responsiveness and empathy towards oughts and reasons. So as to facilitate 
the reception of concerns which are neither required by our mind states nor urged by 
conventional forces. We may confirm however that the prospects for the strict and detachable 
ought are bleak due to the pervasiveness of conventional morality, the authority of subjective 
weighings of reasons and our subservience to the normative requirement which often confuses 
us to believe that what we are required to do or believe is what we ought to.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Bernard Williams: Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press 1999, ch.10 “Practical necessity”, p.124 
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  Introduction 
When I set out to write this essay I had my mind full of opinions and problems which were 
going to be the agenda of that which you are about to read, if you continue beyond the 
introduction.  
In the course of working on this paper I have taken a path from a grand ambition to sort 
out my life long opinions about conventionality and how the normativity of conventionality 
differs from ideal normativity, to an old-school-morality type of defence against the 
pervasiveness of reasons in contemporary philosophy and life generally. David Lewis was of 
some help in gaining an insight into conventionality, but as I tried to formulate the superior 
alternative to conventionalism via John Broome’s conception of reasoning I realized that one 
may be perfectly coherent and yet conventional or evil. The distinction I was looking for 
would not be found within the aspect of rationality which is concerned with normative 
requirements. 
What I was going to say slowly began to fade away, as ones own thoughts usually do 
when one surrenders to or takes on the conceptualizations of another, as I adopted Broome’s 
distinctions between detachable and non-detachable normativity and strict and slack 
normativity. I subsequently began to write my own theory of morality instead I was told that 
it needed to participate in the philosophical debate. So I leaped back in between the 
philosophers and tried to formulate my views there. I try at first to pin it down within 
Broome’s conceptualizations of the normative forces of rationality. Even if that is not entirely 
successful it at least establishes some obstacles which obtrude the prospects for this kind of an 
ought and it indicates what kind of an ought I actually have in mind, which is a question I 
never really go into. The nature of this ought is after all such that it’s nature won’t be proven 
by argumentation and the conclusion of my reasoning will only follow by requirement.  
The process of writing this essay has therefore both shown and convinced me of the 
enveloping force of normative requirements, a formal normative force which I observe in 
commando of my belief set. And this just strengthens my conviction in that which I want to 
argue for, namely that the external substantial ought ought to be prioritized over the formal 
relational forces which guide our minds. Yet I see how compelling these formal forces are and 
1 
I can understand the view that the way to ought should, does, and must go via our thinking 
about reasons, yet the one thing which we must keep in mind is that what we ought to do may 
be something completely other than and more significant than what we think we ought to do. 
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The first problem of priority 
When Harry Truman received an honourable distinction from Oxford Elizabeth Anscombe 
protested on the ground that “having a couple of massacres to his credit” disqualifies a man 
for public honours.2 In “Modern Moral Philosophy” Anscombe criticizes all “the best known 
English academic moral philosophers” for putting “out a philosophy according to which, e.g., 
it is not possible to hold that it cannot be right to kill the innocent as a means to any end 
whatsoever and that someone who thinks otherwise is in error.”3 In this Anscombe and I are 
kindred spirits. Some oughts cannot be outweighed.  
I depart from Anscombe however by insisting on the strict ought which she, with her 
superior philosophical reflection, disregards as meaningless without the existence of Hebrew-
Christian law ethics. 
What I shall argue is that although you sometimes ought to do something you generally 
ought not to do - a situation which frequently arises within war and other unjust situations – 
the two oughts spoken of in that assertion differ, and the ought to do that which you ideally 
ought not to do is more of a must than an ought. I shall provide a few arguments in favour of 
this. My argumentation should not be seen as conclusive, it is  just an attempt to formulate 
something I feel must be right, but which can hardly be made sense of anymore within the 
contemporary reign of reasons.  
The English academic moral philosophers which Anscombe refers to have treated all 
oughts as weighable: “it is pretty well taken for obvious among them all that a prohibition 
such as that on murder does not operate in face of some consequences.”4  This kind of a view 
is perhaps more pervasive now than ever with all the focus on reasons. Some philosophers 
like Skorupski and Scanlon reduce all ought to reasons. John Broome has however shown that 
rationality consist in far more than reasons and that reasons differ from the other components 
of rationality in their kind of normative force.  
                                                 
2 John M. Dolan : “G. E. M. Anscombe: Living the Truth”  
www.firstthings.com
First Things 113 (May 2001): 11-13.
3 G.E.M. Anscombe: “Modern Moral Philosophy”, ch.1 in (ed.)Roger Crisp and Michael Slote: Virtue Ethics, 
Oxford University Press 2003, pp.26-45, p.35 
4 “Modern Moral Philosophy” p.35 
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it is very commonly said that rationality consists in acting 
an believing for reasons. Indeed, most of the literature on 
rationality is about reasons: it asks what is a reason for 
what. But actually a large part of rationality consists in 
conforming to normative requirements, and is not 
concerned with reasons at all. For instance, one part of 
rationality is doing what you believe you ought to do.5
A normative requirement is what guides reasoning. It requires your mind states to stand in 
correct relations, a requirement that can be satisfied either by adding mind states that are 
implied by your other mind states or by subtracting mind states that stand in contradictory 
relations to other of your mind states. Being normatively required to believe something is not 
the same as having a reason to believe something. Reasoning is not reason giving but only 
requiring.  
Additionally there are ought facts which are the strictest form for normativity. Whereas 
reasons are slack and permit that you don’t comply to them if you have better reasons to do 
something else, ought facts are strict, meaning that non-compliance is a strict failure. Like a 
normative requirement ought facts demand strictly, but unlike a normative requirement their 
normative force is detachable. Normative requirements are non-detachable meaning that their 
normativity is relational, clinging to the scope of the conditional, O(p→q). Detachability 
means that the normativity is narrow scope, Op, and is detached from the conditional, p→Oq, 
at the obtainment of the antecedent. Ought facts share this detachability with reasons.  
The final category of normative forces which constitute rationality according to Broome 
is recommendation. This form is non-detachable and weighable, therefore the weakest form of 
normativity of these four.     
I shall base my argumentation upon the strict and detachable ought, the strongest 
normative force there is, and make some claims about ways in which this is confused with 
other normative forces. 
As is shown by John Broome, there are other normative forces besides those of reasons, 
which differ both in kind and strength. Yet it seems as if there is for some people no limit as 
to what content can play the role of a reason. Which content takes on which kind of a 
normative force seems to depend on context and speaker, at least in praxis. So if I say 
something is an ought fact what kind of corrective can I appeal to in defending my claim 
against another person who takes the same content to be a pro tanto reason? Sadly there 
doesn’t seem to be any way to prove that an ought fact is an ought fact. The conclusions of 
                                                 
5 “Normative Requirements” p.90 
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our reasoning are not detachable and so all I can do is to appeal to reasons. Reasons are often 
a prerequisite for making us motivated by ought facts or imperatives which we are not already 
motivated by. As for instance when you go to the swimming hall you might not take a shower 
before you enter the pool just because there’s a sign on the wall that tells you to do so. But 
you will when you know the reasons why. On the other hand there are also situations and 
relations which don’t demand reasons but simply trust the expertise of someone. 
Moral concerns seem to distinguish themselves in this from cases of subservience to 
experts in that we each contribute and feel that we must contribute a sense of justification to 
our normative beliefs. While we generally don’t question whether a certain medication is 
good for a specific illness but leave that up to the doctor, on the assumption that there is a 
standard here which the doctor knows, we might question whether a certain action is the right 
way to act in a specific situation. We don’t presume that politicians or even philosophers have 
the right answers to questions of what ought to be done in virtue of their education.  
Yet we may disagree about what is a reason for what and how much the reasons weigh. 
It seems as if the normative requirement is the only normative force which is concrete enough 
to facilitate inter-subjective corrections of our compliance to normative forces. We can point 
our when people are mistaken in their reasoning, and we can point out when they confuse 
requirements for oughts and reasons. 
I am now going to consider whether the differentiation of normativity presented by 
Broome is hierarchically ordered in a manner which entails that you ought to comply to an 
ought rather than to a reason and so on.  
What I am going to try to defend is that the strict ought is the top normative force which 
ought to be prioritized above the other normative forces. 
Hierarchy of normative forces  
Ought you to comply to oughts rather than to requirements? Ought you to do what you ought 
to do when this conflicts with what you believe you ought to do? If Broome’s assorted 
normative forces of rationality are hierarchical then one might imagine that the different kinds 
of normativity are ordered in a sequence which also exerts normative pressure between them, 
so that being rational is not just a matter of responding to one of these normative forces or 
each one of them, but of responding to all of them and the correct normative relations 
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between them. The correct normative relations between them (hypothesizing that there are 
any such) can be seen as given by degree or kind of rational demand, so that rationality and 
normativity seem to be interdefinable at some level but not entirely since the interaction 
between the two involves a complicated correspondence between different levels and kinds, it 
might seem as if complying to a weaker form of normativity counters rationality when this 
compliance counters a demand made by a stronger normative force. If this is the case then we 
can within Broome’s theory point to the occurrence of conformity to normative forces which 
is not rational, or certainly not definitory for rationality. The significance of this for my 
agenda is that the normative relations between these different normative forces might provide 
the higher ought which demands or guides in conflicts between these normative forces.  
Let me first present Broome’s assortment of rationality as consisting of four kinds of 
normativity. 6
 
 Strict Slack 
Detaching p oughts q 
p→Oq 
 p reasons q 
 p→Rq 
Non-detaching p requires q 
O(p→q) 
p recommends q 
R(p→q) 
 
We see here that the normative forces of rationality differ in strength and kind from 
ought to recommending. Ought is the strictest form for normativity which in addition to being 
strict is detachable. Detachability means that the normativity is narrow scope, Op, clinging to 
the consequent which is detachable by modus ponens at the obtainment of the antecedent. 
Non-detachable means that the normativity is wide-scope, O(p→q), and not detachable by 
modus ponens. 
You are normatively required by rationality to reason your mind states to mirror the 
correct relations between the content of the propositions of your reasoning. This entails both 
that you remove contradictions by cancelling one of the mind states that result in the 
contradiction and that you reason out the implications of your mind states. All your mind 
states are therefore subordinate to this normative force. But rationality also consists in 
responding to reasons and ought facts. And the normativity of these forces is provided by 
                                                 
6 John Broome: “Normative Requirements”, ch.4 in (ed.) Jonathan Dancy: Normativity, Blackwell 2000, pp.78-
99, p.83 
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facts in the world which determine normative facts of either a strict or a slack kind. 
Detachable normativity therefore places us in a normative relation to the world, whereas non-
detachable normativity is a normative relation between our mind states (and in some sense 
between our mind states and something external to us since the correct relations between the 
content of the propositions of our mind states which our mind states are required to mirror 
exist independently of our knowledge of them). The normativity of a normative requirement 
is therefore relative to ones mind states whereas the normativity of reasons and ought facts is 
relative to facts.  
The distinction between normative requirements and detachable normativity seems to 
facilitate a reformulation of the dispute between internal and external reasons as having been 
a dispute between two different kinds of normative forces. Broome’s distinction shows that 
both these kinds of normative forces exist and that they differ in significant ways. 
Consequently the point of interest is no longer whether reasons are external or internal but 
how these different normative forces interrelate and  how the implications of their differences 
can be traced.  
As is shown by the other normative forms seem to be weaker than ought in one or two 
ways, as Broome says, “the reasons relation and the requires relation are both, in a sense, 
weakenings of the oughts relation.”7 A recommendation is removed from an ought by having 
both these weakenings, being slack and non-detachable.  
Are the differences between these forms of normativity such that conflicts between 
them ought that you conform to the one which is stronger? Does compliance to weaker forms 
of normativity, against stronger forms, imply a failure of rationality?  
The vertical axis distinguishes between forms of normativity which are conditional 
upon one’s mind states and those that apply to you independently of your mind states. The 
horizontal axis distinguishes between the kind or degree of demand. Strict normativity applies 
unreservedly (when it applies) in the sense that there are no excuses or alternatives. Slack 
normativity is on the other hand compatible with contrary claims and non-compliance may 
not imply any failure on your part. Although there are reasons for you not to do that which 
you are doing, there may be better reasons for you to do it and then it’s not a failure of 
rationality to fail to see to this reason.  
Suppose p is true but q is not. Then if the oughts relation 
holds, you are definitely failing to see to something you 
ought to see to. You ought to see to it that q, and you do 
                                                 
7 “Normative Requirements” p.90 
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not. On the other hand, if only the reasons relation holds, 
you may be failing to see to nothing you ought to see to. 
You have a reason to see to it that q, but you may also 
have a better reason not to see to it that q, and in that case 
you are doing nothing wrong if you do not see to it.8
In other words, it seems as if failures to comply with strict forms of normativity always 
imply failures of rationality, whereas failures to comply with slack forms of normativity may 
imply no failure of rationality. 
What then about contradictory demands posed by the different kinds of strict 
normativity? Ought I to see that a normative requirement is stronger than a recommendation 
and that I therefore ought to comply to the normative requirement rather than the 
recommendation? Between normative requirements and reasons the question seems to pose 
incompatible entities since these normative forces are weakenings of ought facts in different 
ways. One prescribes what you have reason to do and the other what you are required to do.  
There is no contest. Reasons are concerned with what you 
ought to see to, and normative requirements are not. For 
example, suppose the balance of reasons is in favour of 
your seeing to it that q. Then you ought to see to it that q, 
because the reasons together determine what you ought to 
see to. Your contrary belief normatively requires you not 
to see to it that q, but this does not count at all in 
determining what you ought to see to.9
This gives the impression that oughts and requirements don’t interfere with each other 
since they demand differently. But when they demand differently they do place us under 
conflicting demands and the question I am asking is whether the differences between the 
kinds of demands that they give can provide an answer as to which one of the conflicting 
demands I ought, in a different sense, to comply to. Does the detachable normativity of an 
ought imply a stronger or more important ought than the normativity of a requirement? 
Broome’s formulation of weakenings does make it seem so. (This is when my interpretation 
of and embellishment of Broome really takes over.) 
For example, if you are required by you mind states to believe q, yet you ought not to 
believe q, are you then rational to believe q? You are required to believe q, and failures to 
comply with normative requirements are strict failures of rationality. Therefore you are in this 
case rational yet not as you ought to be, and failures to comply with ought facts are also strict 
                                                 
8 “Normative Requirements” p.81 
9 “Normative Requirements” p.92 
 8 
 
failures of rationality. You are rational in one sense and not rational in another. How are we to 
conceive of the relation between the presence and absence of these different kinds of or 
components of rationality as together constituting rationality? 10  
One would expect that all of them should be fulfilled. Yet a normative requirement is 
satisfied independently of ought facts and reasons. Rationality does not entirely consist in the 
fulfilment of normative requirements because rationality consists in more than that. Can we 
then say that since normative requirements aim to or require of me that my mind states don’t 
stand in incorrect relations in the form of not having reasoned out the implications of my 
mind states or having mind states that are or imply contradictions, that if I have avoided all 
these mistakes then I am qualified for rationality? I am not failing to be rational within the 
part of rationality that concerns normative requirements. Yet I may be failing to comply with 
other parts of rationality, and what is then the verdict concerning my rationality? 
Rationality could perhaps also be split into four corresponding kinds of rationality. Then 
these four kinds would be inter-definable with their respective forms of normativity. But 
rationality is not split into kinds. Rationality consists in all these different kinds of normative 
forces, where one does not give a complete definition of rationality, and where rationality as a 
certain combination of all four does not define any one kind of normativity. The relation 
between normativities and rationality is therefore quite complex within Broome’s scheme and 
it seems doubtful that even if we were to say what the exact normative relation between the 
different forms of normativity were, so that we had one higher formulation of normativity as 
the interaction between the four kinds of sub-normativites that we still couldn’t say that this 
entity was inter-definable for rationality. 
One way to conceive of these different normative forces as together constituting 
rationality is to see that ought facts make a positive demand: you ought to comply to ought 
facts; whereas normative requirements make a negative demand: your mind states ought not 
to stand in incorrect relations. Normative requirements then don’t ascertain the presence of 
rationality. Satisfying normative requirements makes you rational in the sense of rationality 
which means absence of irrationality. Additionally, you need the presence of positive 
rationality. Ought facts and reasons supposedly provide or demand the presence of certain 
beliefs and intentions which it is rational to have. Sometimes it seems irrational not to have 
them but I think that in normal circumstances it doesn’t. If you don’t know you don’t know. 
It’s not irrational not to know. But there are certain relations one might stand in to this 
                                                 
10 “Normative Requirements” p.90 confirms that rationality consists in different parts 
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information which would make it irrational not to know. Perhaps this would in most cases be 
explained in terms of normative requirements. It seems always at least to find an explanation 
in terms of your mind states.   
One might object to this that calling one of these demands positive and the other 
negative is arbitrary since the description could be switched. Might I not just as well say that 
you ought not to not comply with ought facts and your mind states ought to stand in correct 
relations to each other? To this I reply that I don’t think the switched descriptions would be 
sufficient or correct renderings of their respective normative forces. A positive demand can 
only be made by ought facts and reasons since these are the normative force which are 
detachable and apply disregarding your mind states. Consequently they can be substantial. 
Normative requirements on the other hand are such that which correct relations your mind 
states ought to stand in depends on which mind states you have, and how you choose to 
arrange them (what to cancel, what to keep) in order to make the relations correct. Therefore 
the normative requirement must be formulated in terms of formal criteria (not substantial) and 
will guide you in terms of the kind of state you ought not to be in, a state of incorrectly related 
mind states, rather than prescribing which mind states you ought to have. (The correct 
relations which a normative requirement is based on might of course have a substantial 
grounding, but this substantial explanation is at a different level. The requirements we are 
under are formal although they might be traced back to a substantial existence.) 
Bootstrapping 
your believing p plainly cannot be a reason to believe p. 
Beliefs do not justify themselves; that would be an 
impossible sort of bootstrapping. So it cannot be a general 
principle that believing p  is a reason to believe p’s 
immediate consequences.11
 “Relations among your beliefs and intentions […] imply no narrow-scope normative 
conditions on individual beliefs or intentions.”12 The oughts that regulate the relations among 
your beliefs and intentions are normative requirements. Having a normative requirement to 
                                                 
11 “Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values?”, p.6 
12 “Reasons” p.2 
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believe something is different from, and does not provide, reasons or oughts to intend or 
believe that which you are required to intend or believe.  
Being required to believe or intend q is different from having a reason or ought fact to 
believe or intend q and does not in any way imply or entail that you have a reason to do so or 
ought to do so. It may very well be that you ought not to. “Correct reasoning will lead you to 
have beliefs and intentions that you are normatively required to have by others of your beliefs 
and intentions. But it may not lead you to beliefs and intentions you have reason to have.”13 A 
normative requirement requires that your mind states stand in correct relations. Confusing this 
with the normativity of ought facts, which demand that you have specific mind states, or 
confusing it with reasons which give you a reason to have certain mind states, is what is 
called bootstrapping. Believing that you ought to believe something because it follows from 
your other beliefs, or that you ought to intend something because it is a necessary means to 
another intention you have is to bootstrap these beliefs. Our beliefs and intentions never 
provide reasons nor oughts for beliefs or intentions, they simply require them. “Reasoning in 
general is neither ought-giving nor reason-giving.”14 To mistake the relation of requirement 
for a reason or an ought fact is to bootstrap one’s mind states. This is illegitimate reference to 
normative forces. Reasons and ought facts exist independently of our mind states. Our mind 
states don’t add further reasons. 
A reason to intend to take the boat is that it will carry you 
to the wild and beautiful island of Rum. This reason exists 
independently of your intention to visit Rum. But if this 
intention was also a further reason to intend to take the 
boat, it would be a reason you create yourself by forming 
the intention to visit Rum. It is puzzling how you could 
create a reason in that way; Michael Bratman calls it 
‘bootstrapping’ the reason into existence.15
The commitment of belief 
When we believe something we presume that our belief is right. That’s what it is to believe. 
And that entails that you think it is wrong not to believe it. But this conviction of rightness 
                                                 
13 “Normative Requirements” p.90 
14 John Broome: “Practical Reasoning”, p.5 
15 “Reasons” p.2 
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which accompanies or constitutes our beliefs may just as well be an effect as a cause or 
ground of our beliefs. Yet we all presume that the rightness precedes our belief, although 
there is a slight chance that this rightness might just be an effect of belief thought to precede 
its cause. But there are always reasons or grounds or explanations for our beliefs, and these 
are such that we take them as providers of rightness.  
To believe that a certain proposition – a certain potential 
belief content – is true or is supported by the evidence or 
is entailed by something that is itself accepted is to 
believe, in effect, that it is right to believe the proposition, 
wrong to disbelieve it: it is to believe that there are norms 
that require the attitude, at least when other things are 
equal16. 
Pettit and Smith here describe how belief in the rightness of a belief is equally likened to all 
the different ways in which a belief might be supported or urged. This points to the 
asymmetry between belief in rightness on the one hand and rightness of belief on the other 
hand. Believing that it is right to believe something is equally related to all the different ways 
of making it right to believe, whereas all these different ways might not provide equal 
rightness for belief, if the different normative forces don’t provide equal rightness. As I have 
suggested one might take Broome’s presention of these different normative forces as 
providing different kinds of rightness which also differ in strength.  
On the other hand, if it is true that we perceive beliefs as right and wrong in this way, 
why should hierarchical ordering of ways of justifying or making the rightness of a belief be 
prioritized over belief in rightness? If we believe that it is right to believe p and wrong not to 
believe it, disregarding which kind of support or encouragement we have for that belief, then 
will it matter to us which support other people have for their contrary beliefs? In fact it does. 
In fact when other things are not equal we have such a situation and we are usually sensitive 
to opposing claims to rightness and to the different kinds of rightness they claim.  
The idea of ought facts is implicit in this kind of commitment which our beliefs place us 
under. We presume their existence when we presume that our beliefs are right. When we have 
a normative belief we presume that there is an ought fact supporting our belief. BO(p) → 
B(Op) Is it possible then that the conception of ought facts and detachable normativity is just 
a derivative of conviction, an effect of normative belief which is thought to precede its cause.  
                                                 
16 Philip Pettit and Michael Smith: “Freedom in Belief and Desire”, essay nr.20 in (ed.) Gary Watson: Free Will 
2.ed., OUP, 2003, pp.388-408, p.393 My italics 
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To hold a normative belief is to believe in an ought fact. BO(p) ≈ B(Эx(Fx & F→Op)). 
Implicit in our normative beliefs seems to be the belief in an overriding ought prescribing that 
normative belief. Along the lines of the rightness Pettit and Smith describe. When I have a 
normative belief and believe that the content of this belief is an ought fact then I seem also to 
believe that I ought to believe it. O(Op → BO(p)). But this overriding ought seems to appear 
in the shape of a normative requirement when we consider that the additional beliefs about the 
ought fact which accompany our belief in it may arise without the actual existence of this 
ought fact. Our normative belief is then just circular upon itself and takes that which is 
presumed to underlie it to be the actual existence of an ought fact whereas the belief in this in 
fact takes the shape of a normative requirement. Since I believe O(Op → BO(p)) and I believe 
the antecedent. But from this we can’t derive that we ought to believe it. So it does not follow 
that my belief bootstraps into existence an ought to believe p.  
My belief doesn’t bring about an ought fact. I cannot bootstrap an ought fact into 
existence by believing it. What I seem to be suggesting here however is that it seems possible 
to claim that the whole idea of ought facts is bootstrapped into existence in just this way. By 
the presumption that my normative belief implies the existence of an ought fact, and therefore 
oughts that I believe it. 
We might thereby sceptically presume that there are no ought facts at all. The 
conclusion would nevertheless be in favour of ought facts since normative beliefs involve 
belief in ought facts such that it elicits belief in O(Op → BO(p)) and isn’t that sufficient 
grounding for the existence of ought?  
What is the significance of detachability? 
Dancy thinks the contrast between detachable and non-detachable forms of normativity 
“seems exaggerated”. The exaggeration lies for Dancy in this: “There is not much gap 
between saying that you ought, if you have promised, to keep your promise and saying that if 
you have promised, you ought to keep your promise.”17 In other words, the difference 
between relational, O(p→q), and non-relational normativity, p→Oq,  is minimal in Dancy’s 
view.  
                                                 
17 Jonathan Dancy: Practical Reality, Oxford University Press 2004, p.71 
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Dancy thinks that detachable normativity means that  
if we know that her need favours (or even demands) your 
helping her, and that she is in need, we know that you 
have a reason (or even ought) to help her. Where the left 
hand side of the relation is satisfied, normativity passes to 
the right hand side.18  
Dancy describes here the way in which a fact implies an ought fact or reason, p→Oq, 
which would be a conditional underlying an ought fact or a reason, and claims that when the 
antecedent obtains the consequent is normative. On the reading of Broome which I defend 
this is not what detachability is. It is not the case that the normativity passes to the right hand 
side, but rather that the right hand side becomes detached. And the significance of this 
detachment is that it obtains disregarding anybody’s knowledge of it. The reason why Dancy 
misses this significant difference is that he fails to distinguish non-detachable normativity 
from detachable normativity. The way his description is construed likens it more to a 
requirement than to an ought or a reason. When we know a conditional as Dancy says “we 
know that her need favours (or even demands) your helping her”, and we know that the 
antecedent is true as Dancy says “we know […] that she is in need”, then the conclusion that 
follows, that “we know that you have a reason (or even ought) to help her”, follows by the 
normativity of a requirement. It is not true concerning a requirement that the normativity 
passes to the right hand side, however, it remains relational, but besides that Dancy’s 
description is of a normative requirement rather than an ought or a reason.  
The significant distinction Broome focuses on is that the normativity resides in the fact 
itself, in contrast to the normativity of a normative requirement which is relational. “Bp 
requires Bq […] attaches normativity to the relation between believing p and believing q, not 
to believing q itself.”19 Just as Dancy accounts for the normativity of that which is detachable 
as a relation to knowing or believing a conditional and that the antecedent obtains. That ought 
facts and reasons are detachable does not entail that I (or somebody else) must detach the 
consequent, but that this consequent is normative when the antecedent obtains, disregarding 
anybody’s knowledge of this facts relation(s) to conditionals, and disregarding anybody’s 
knowledge of whether these facts obtain. The difference lies in where and how the 
normativity obtains. Relational normativity obtains in relation to its premises, meaning that 
the conclusion obtains in relation to the premises which require it. The conclusion of a 
                                                 
18 Jonathan Dancy: “Editor’s Introduction” to Normativity, Blackwell 2000, pp.vii-xv, p.ix 
19 John Broome: “Practical Reasoning” p.6 
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requirement is therefore not normative in relation to the world or to people who don’t share 
my mind states. Detachable normativity on the other hand is normative everywhere and to 
everything once it obtains. The difficulty then is that when we have normative beliefs these 
partake in our reasoning and therefore take on non-detachable normativity, while the way in 
which we intend them and take them to be normative is as a detachable normative force.  
The relation of an ought or a reason is therefore between facts or states in the world and 
ought facts or reasons, whereas the relation of requirement is between your mind states. When 
certain mind states obtain you are under certain requirements. Ought facts and reasons 
however are only conditional upon propositions of or facts obtaining in the world and 
therefore supply you with oughts and reasons which you consequently may not be aware of. 
You may have a reason to, or ought to, help your sister despite the fact that nobody knows 
that she is in need nor that her need favours your helping.  
On my view then detachable normativity is not relational to anybody’s mind states. 
Dancy formulates detachable normativity in internalist terms, in the sense that the normativity 
only obtains as relations between a persons mind states, meaning as non-detachable 
normativity.  
Here is an attempt at an example which might distinguish the two. If A promised to do X 
but later thought about it and cancelled his promise, to himself, then he released himself from 
the normative requirement, O(p→q), by cancelling the antecedent. This change of mind might 
not however have released him from the ought fact. It is still the case that he promised, so the 
consequent is detached and it is not normative in relation to the antecedent, therefore he still 
ought to q. 
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Strict and slack normativity 
Broome accounts for two kinds of normative reasons: Perfect and pro tanto. Pro tanto reasons 
are the reasons we weigh against each other in order to decide what to do. Perfect reasons are 
the explanations of ought facts which take on normativity when we slide them into the 
position of being reasons for these ought facts rather than the reasons why.  
We slide from ‘X is the reason why you ought to Φ’ to ‘X 
is the reason for you to Φ’, meaning exactly the same 
thing by it. The non-normative ‘reason’ (meaning 
explanation) slides into the normative ‘ought’, yielding a 
normative sense of ‘reason’ that combines the meaning of 
both.20  
 
Both these reasons stand in relations to ought facts which can be interpreted in 
internalist ways and encourage the view that what we believe to be an ought fact is an ought 
fact. The relation between pro tanto reasons and ought is such that “when the reasons for you 
to Φ outweigh the reasons for you not to Φ, then you ought to Φ.”21 Of the relation between 
perfect reasons and oughts Broome says that “you ought to Φ if and only if you have a perfect 
reason to Φ.”22 Both these formulations are by themselves open to the question of whether the 
having of these reasons is intended in the external or internal sense of a reason. Of course 
with the consideration that we might be mistaken, a mistake which can be explained without 
recourse to the existence of an external corrective, this might not be neither problematic nor 
unlikely the correct view of the relation between oughts and reasons. Nevertheless I am going 
to consider the possibility that Broome’s distinctions between normative forces remove us 
quite a bit from this view into a view that does not give us such easy access to ought facts. 
This view maintains the externality of detachable normativity via a sort of evidence 
transcendence which assures that the ideal strict ought exists independently of the oughts of 
our practical decisions. 
                                                 
20 “Reasons” p.6 
21 “Reasons” p.10 
22 “Reasons” p.7 
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Broome’s distinction between detachable and non-detachable normativity alleviates in 
many ways the controversies between internal and external reasons by reformulating at least 
some parts of the disagreements in terms of divergent normative forces. Yet the controversy 
between internalism and externalism can be seen to remain within his category of detachable 
normativity. The reason for this is that he provides a link between reasons and oughts, the two 
types of detachable normativity. That our weighing of reasons ends in an ought is a view 
which seems to limit ought to our normative beliefs.  
On this reading we end up with the view that we are the constructors of ought facts. 
These ought facts would also consequently be revisable, it’s not an altogether unlikely view, 
but it would imply that slack normativity is turned into strict normativity by our weighing of 
reasons. Our weighing of reasons is limited by several factors which I think provides good 
reason to object to this view.   
I will first present evidence which points in the direction of a distinction between slack 
and strict oughts within Broome’s theory running between the ought of reasons and the other 
ought. Then I am going to present three reasons why I don’t think it’s correct that the 
agglomerate of pro tanto reasons make an ought. The argumentation is directed as an 
objection against the path from pro tanto reasons to the strict and detachable ought and does 
not object to the agglomerate of pro tanto reasons making any ought at all, but simply aims to 
accentuate three points about pro tanto reasons which make the agglomerate ought 
distinctively different from the strict detachable ought. Afterwards I am going to consider 
how and whether Broome’s distinction between weighing and non-weighing explanations 
affect the distinction between strict and slack normativity in a way which secludes at least 
some oughts from being amendable by our weighings and which also functions as a corrective 
to our weighings of reasons, both when these are weighable and when they are mistakenly 
taken to be weighable. 
Do pro tanto reasons make an ought? 
Broome considers three objections to the conclusion that pro tanto reasons make an ought. 
The first of these is Dancy’s objection that agglomerated reasons can be of two kinds, enticing 
and others, whereof the others are peremptory and therefore imply ought in the strict sense, 
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while “enticing reasons merely make Φing attractive.”23 In cases where there only is one 
enticing reason in favour of Φing, Dancy objects that this does not provide an ought. Broome 
on the other hand maintains in response that “enticing reasons lead to oughts”. But he adds 
that it would be permissible not to do that which one ought to do in such cases.  
Having admitted that the ought-product of agglomerated reasons (at least when they 
exclusively consist of enticing reasons) is slack, which is precisely what the permissibility not 
to comply to an ought means, Broome seems explicitly to have differentiated this ought from 
the strict ought which is distinguished from reasons in “Normative Requirements”. The strict 
ought is such that given ‘if p is the case, you ought to q’, and supposing that ‘p is true but q is 
not’, then “if the oughts relation holds, you are definitely failing to see to something you 
ought to see to. You ought to see to it that q, and you do not.”24 This seems to provide 
evidence that the ought of the agglomerate of reasons, at least sometimes, is another than the 
strict ought. 
Another objection to the theory that agglomerated reasons make an ought which 
Broome considers is that “Sometimes the reasons for you to Φ outweigh those for you not to 
Φ, but it is not the case that you ought to Φ because Φing would be very demanding – it 
would be supererogatory.”25 Broome’s reply to this is simply that the ought permits you not to 
do it. “If  Φing is supererogatory, then you are not obliged to Φ. Also, it is permissible for you 
not to.”26 This also confirms that this ought is weaker than the strict ought which I am 
defending. (Take that ought as inspired by the strictness Broome presents in “Normative 
Requirements”.) 
 
Reasons not to do that which you ought to do 
The first point I want to argue for is that when a weighing explanation with reasons both for 
and against Φing ends up in favour of Φing, then even though it in some sense is the case that 
you ought to Φ, this ought does not eliminate or reduce the opposing reasons.  These will still 
retain their normative force and be reasons for you not to be doing that which you are doing, 
although you are justified in doing that which you are doing because the aggregate of all the 
                                                 
23 “Reasons” p.10 
24 “Normative Requirements” p.81 
25 This objection is provided by David McNaughton and Michael Smith. “Reasons”, p.11 
26 same 
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reasons was in favour of your doing it. This point might seem redundant. The purpose of the 
objection is to weaken the ought which is produced by agglomeration.  
Consequently one might ask why the agglomerate should be formulated in terms of an 
ought and not just in terms of an agglomeration of reasons. There seems to be an ought 
involved because it would be wrong not to act on the agglomeration. But calling the 
agglomerate ought is misleading in that it also oughts you to act against the counter-reasons. 
Now as Broome has distinguished reasons from the other normative forces by their slack 
normativity, it is not a failure to act contrary to some reasons when the agglomerate of all the 
reasons is in favour of your doing the opposite. I wish to nuance the lack of a failure into a 
reasoned disregard. A reasoned disregard also implies that non-compliance to a reason may 
not be a failure. However, it distinguishes between the level of having a reason to disregard 
that reason and the level of being justified in that disregard. It maintains the possibility of 
having weighed incorrectly within the formulation rather than the agglomerate ought which 
seems to much more decisively raise the agglomerate and lay aside the opposing reasons. I 
think that even when the agglomerate is concluded acting on pro tanto reasons is a two-sided 
business. The failure to comply to an agglomerate ought also differs from a failure to comply 
to strict oughts since it is possible that you might have weighed the reasons differently. We 
tend to leave a little room for alternative weighings of reasons. We may say oh you weighed it 
like that, I see. With strict oughts we tend to be less understanding. 
The quintessence of my objections to the agglomerate ought is that the conclusion of an 
agglomeration is always open for reconsideration. The balance depends on which reasons 
were taken into consideration and how much they were taken to weigh, and how they were 
agglomerated. At the emergence of an additional reason or the realization that one reason was 
incorrectly taken to weigh less than it did, the balance changes. It is therefore important not to 
impregnate the balance with some additional and other normative force, such as that of an 
ought. That seems to me to resemble bootstrapping. Presumably once an ought is established 
it is not easily dissolved into reasons again. On the reasons account oughts seems to have such 
an ephemeral quality. The strictness of an ought is conditional upon ones agreement to the 
agglomerate and or perfect reasons which support the ought. This again explains how oughts 
vary from context to context.  
On the alternative account of oughts which I am considering the prospects of, an ought 
is presumably not adjustable like the agglomerate of reasons. If there are strict oughts that 
make demands disregarding people’s weighings of reasons then they must not be adjustable 
by subjective weighings. Therefore the ought of the agglomerate of reasons should remain in 
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the category of reasons as slack. Conflict between strict oughts is not reducible. What needs 
suggestion is where the limit goes between that which is weighable and that which isn’t. If all 
oughts were produced by the weighing of reasons then conflicting oughts would result from 
divergent measurements of reasons and could be reconciled by reweighing the reasons in 
some way, or alternatively would stagnate at the point of incommensurability.  
My objection is based on the assumption that agglomerated oughts are continually up 
for revision, which they are in one sense since we may be mistaken, and when we realize that 
we are mistaken we adjust the agglomerations. When we are mistaken it is of course the 
wrong agglomerate which is adjusted, not the actual or right agglomerate, so in one sense 
agglomerates are not up for revision. In addition to being continually open for correction of 
mistakes they are also continually open for elaboration and accentuation in terms of adding 
further reasons or more weight, thereby adjusting the agglomerate ought. An agglomerate 
ought can be made to seem more right and more important in this way. This kind of 
adjustment implies that the ought is not simply pro or con but contains and is in some way all 
the reasons that support it. This is a consideration in support of a  non-reductive view of pro 
tanto reasons with the agglomerate emergence of some kind of a compelling ought added. 
Because the agglomerate does have an ought that is stronger than any of the pro tanto reasons. 
As Broome says the agglomerate isn’t the sum of the reasons. I sat the agglomerate is more 
than a pro tanto reason, but it is less than the strict ought.  
Do we make ought facts? 
When weighing makes an ought, then which oughts there are depends on which reasons we 
see, or take account of, how much weight we attribute to them, and how we weigh them. 
When pro tanto reasons are weighed we end up with an agglomeration which oughts in 
favour of doing or not doing. If the agglomerate of reasons becomes an ought, and we are the 
agglomerators of reasons, then we make ought facts. That would represent a leap from slack 
detachability to strict.  
A favouring consideration to this account of ought, the reasons account, is that we can 
add and amplify reasons for others, and there is reason to believe that the collectively 
discursive provision of reasons will lead to collective ought facts. And that it is the only 
justifiable way to do so. Yet for this kind of inter-subjective discussion and approval of 
reasons and oughts to go in the direction of ought facts rather than agglomerates which 
express what we most want or believe is best we must be sensitivite to the reasons of others 
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and our ability to weigh without taking all our own considerations to weigh heavier than the 
considerations of others. With all the empirical examples of the failure to do so, we have good 
reason to argue in favour of strict oughts rather than oughts with weighing explanations. The 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was handled as a weighing explanation.  
There is at least some limit as to how ought facts can be agglomerated according to 
Broome. They cannot correctly be agglomerated on the basis of bootstrapping reasons. This 
can be seen from his denial that our decisions provide reasons. We already know this from the 
bootstrapping objection, but I shall now show how significant this distinction is when it 
comes to preferences and making decisions. Broome comes with a compelling example of 
how a decision may make incommensurate values27 commensurate given the assumption that 
decisions provide reasons. Abraham makes incommensurable values28 weighable by deciding 
to sacrifice his son. Broome says that “his choice made them [the incommensurate 
alternatives of obeying God or saving his son] commensurate for him.”29 This would show 
that we each might contribute something subjective to our weighings, except that the example 
is based on the view that intentions are reasons which Broome denies. Given that Abrahams 
decision to sacrifice Isaac adds to the reasons in favour of sacrificing Isaac, then his intention 
adds to the reasons in favour of sacrificing Isaac so that when Abraham reconsiders whether 
to sacrifice Isaac or disobey God the balance is no longer what it was prior to his original 
decision since that added an extra reason. Broome holds that this is incorrect and maintains 
instead that we can cancel our intentions provided that we think about it for a little while. 
Thereby Broome also rejects that Abraham’s choice “made it the case that for him this was 
the better thing to do.”30 If it were the case that intentions are reasons then “We might say [of 
the alternatives] that objectively they were incommensurate but subjectively, for Abraham 
once he had made his decision, the sacrifice was better.”31 That this is not the case, which is 
shown by the bootstrapping objection, implies that our decisions and preferences amongst 
incommensurate values don’t add anything to an agglomeration, which makes it seem 
doubtful that we ought to do that which we prefer to do because we prefer it. Preferences 
might be seen to be expressed by ones agglomeration or they might be taken as reasons. This 
                                                 
27 “neither is better than the other, yet we also cannot say they are equally good”, “Are intentions reasons? And 
how should we cope with incommensurable values?”, p.12 
28 “such different values that it is impossible to weigh them against each other precisely”, “Are intentions 
reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values?”, p.12 
29 “Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values?”, p.14 
30 “Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values?”, p.14 
31 “Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values?”, p.14 
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may depend on the actual case. I think it is common to presume that if you prefer to Φ then 
you have an extra reason to Φ.  
But then we might ask, when are values incommensurable and what makes them 
incommensurable? Doesn’t incommensurability depend on what we experience as 
incommensurable? We clearly disagree about which values are incommensurable.  
But in the end, since we may be mistaken, it is not the case that we make ought facts, at 
least not entirely, since we do so fallibly. When we realize that we were mistaken, that could 
possibly be because we now see a better and more correct weighing explanation, which our 
previous weighing is incorrect in comparison to, or if one prefers, because we have come 
closer to approaching an ought fact which exists independently of our mind states. So the 
sense of us being creators of ought facts is realistically toned down. 
One may after all be mistaken 
It seems as if we construct ought facts because we pick out (either actively or passively) 
which reasons there are (which reasons we think of), and which weight they have. Since we 
may be mistaken about both which reasons there are and how much they weigh, as well as 
how to agglomerate these together, it seems that there is some standard which we may be 
mistaken in comparison to and that there consequently exists a standard about which oughts 
there in fact are, which are the oughts we should agglomerate in specific situations. In that 
case when we are mistaken about ought facts, what we believed to be an ought fact turned out 
not to be one. Normally this kind of case is explained in terms of a distinction between 
motivating or explanatory reasons and normative reasons, “the reason for which you Φ” and 
“a reason for you to Φ”32. Broome however shows that the distinction really lies between 
normative requirements and reasons and is grounded in a confusion of these normative forces 
where that which one is required to believe or intend is taken to be something one has reason 
to believe or intend. Broome presents this in terms of his tentative account of normative 
practical reasoning which presents normative beliefs as mind states which require that you 
intend them.33 In this quote he says that the normative belief requires you to act on it (rather 
than intend it), but he denies that in an endnote to the article. 
                                                 
32 “Reasons”, p.22 
33 “By ‘normative practical reasoning’ I mean reasoning that has a normative belief ineliminably amongst its 
premise-states, and concludes in an intention.” “if you believe you ought to tack, your belief normatively 
requires you to intend to tack.” “Normative Practical Reasoning”, p.4 and p.5 respectively 
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the fact you believe you ought to Φ normatively requires 
you to Φ. It is not that the fact you ought to Φ is a reason 
for you to Φ. It is not even that the fact you believe you 
ought to Φ is a reason for you to Φ. To think this confuses 
reasons and normative requirements34
 
Broome’s suggested theory of normative practical reasoning provides in this way an 
account of the normative relation between normative beliefs and intentions that shows these 
normative beliefs to play the role of a normative requirement rather than that of a reason or an 
ought fact. When I have a normative belief (in the sense of when I believe I ought to do 
something) then this gives me a requirement to do it. A requirement differs from reasons and 
ought facts by being non-detachable. The normativity is therefore wide-scope, and takes the 
form O(BO(p) → I(p)) rather than the narrow-scope normative form which we would expect 
to be attached to the ought fact, Op → OI(p), or just Op.  
We know that although I believe I ought to do something and am consequently required 
to intend it this does not imply that I ought to intend it. When we act on our normative beliefs 
we are (according to Broome’s tentative theory of practical normative reasoning) guided by 
relational normativity. Relational normativity is not directly transferable to others. Ought 
therefore seems to play the corrective to our normative beliefs in two ways. First of all 
because our normative beliefs might be mistaken and secondly because the normative force of 
an ought is other than a requirement. The consequence of this distinction between detachable 
and non-detachable normativity is, if Broome is right about normative practical reasoning, 
that the implications of our normative beliefs follow the force of a requirement, and not that 
of an ought or a reason. Considering that normative requirements are provided by our mind 
states and not by reasons or ought facts, this places us at a further distance from the oughts 
facts than we would expect.  
Since ought facts are ought facts and our normative beliefs may be mistaken, it is not 
our normative beliefs which are oughts facts, althought the content of them may be ought 
facts in case we have the right normative beliefs, and consequently detachable normativity is 
external and refers to the corrective of our normative beliefs rather than to our normative 
beliefs. I shall illustrate this with a few examples. 
“Suppose there is a slight balance of antecedent reasons against going, but you made a 
mistake in your calculations and wrongly decided to go.”35 This seems to presume that 
                                                 
34 “Reasons”, p.23 
35 “Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values?” p.1 
 23 
 
particular reasons with particular weights or perhaps particular aggregated weights exist 
independently of our weighing. Something as such seems to be a prerequisite of being 
mistaken. Unless mistakes are made in comparison to other weighings which are taken to be 
correct. 
That reasons are weighed into oughts independently of our weighing of them  seems 
also to underlie the earlier mentioned remark about a conflict between reasons and 
requirements where “the balance of reasons is in favour of your seeing to it that q, but you 
believe you ought not to see to it that q. Then you ought to see to it that q, because the reasons 
together determine what you ought to see to.”36 Since your normative belief is contrary to the 
ought which results from the weighing of reasons I presume that you did not weigh the 
reasons together correctly. Your normative belief might also be based on a weighing of 
reasons, but in that case one which agglomerated differently (and incorrectly). The conflict 
between requirements and reasons which Broome is pointing to in the example is at the level 
of doing, between what you are required to do and what you ought to do. The premise for the 
requirement and the ought are however both ought statements, and therefore at that level 
conflicting ougths, of which one is seemingly internal and the other external. 
When our reasoning is wrong this is because our mind states fail to mirror the correct 
relations between the content of the propositions of our mind states.37 When our weighing of 
reasons is wrong this is presumably because we have forgotten to take account of some 
reasons and or we have incorrectly weighed some of them. But what kind of a standard can 
there be for which reasons there are and how much they weigh? If reasons were stable entities 
which held a given weight over time then perhaps we could imagine what a standard would be 
like. It seems however that their weight and existence vary over time. It seems highly unlikely 
therefore that there is any standard of correctness concerning reasons which can parallel the 
standard of correctness which our reasoning is subject to. And if there conceivably were such 
a standard there is reason to believe that we would not subordinate ourselves to it anyways. 
Our finding and weighing of reasons seems to be constitutive of who we are and who we want 
to be as well as our morality.  
Weighing seems to be successful or not depending on whether we feel good about the 
outcome, whether we in the end feel that we did the right thing. If we just obeyed some 
                                                 
36 “Normative Requirements” p.92 
37 “If reasoning is correct, the propositions that constitute its content stand in a particular relation to each other: 
the relation such that the conclusion is validly derivable from the premises. The relation of normative 
requirement that holds between the beliefs mirrors this relation of inference that holds between the belief’s 
contents.” “Normative Requirements”, p.86  
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corrective we might not attain this feeling, unless we were entirely dedicated to obey this 
corrective and all recognition we cared about was focused on this. Elizabeth Anscombe seems 
to conceive of the moral ought as being based on the latter kind of a corrective, in the form of 
Hebrew-Christian ethics. When this dispersed the moral ought lost its reference. By this she 
implies that nothing replaced the corrective and that obligation thereafter dispersed into 
relativism. The feeling of having done the right thing would have existed under Herbrew-
Christian ethics as well, but it would have had an explicit external corrective to follow. One 
would know whether one could have this feeling or not depending on whether one’s actions 
matched the corrective. Now that we don’t have this kind of an external corrective we might 
be left to find out what outcomes we feel good about on our own. This is the kind of idea 
Bernard Williams bases his account of moral luck on.  
I would like to maintain a further dimension of rightness which goes beyond individual 
weighings of reasons based on this kind of a subjective feeling. It doesn’t have to find 
recourse to prescribed oughts, but will at least take account of ought in a perspective which 
exceeds the individual. The kind of justification for one’s actions which Williams defends is 
one “that need not provide him with any way of justifying himself to others, or at least to all 
others.”38
An individual dealing with reasons is located amongst other individuals who might 
weigh the reasons differently and might object to his weighings of reasons and his failure to 
consider certain reasons and so on. Subsequently we may also rebuke ourselves for such 
failures. We influence each other by pointing out further reasons and by making it clear how 
much we take a reason to weigh, and sometimes we may refuse that a concern is weighable at 
all. On one hand there is this element to reasons that we can, even after an obvious failure, 
console ourselves with the knowledge that we weighed the reasons as well as we could. On 
the other hand there is the aspect of whether this is taken to justify one’s action and whether it 
seems all things considered to do so. Talk about reasons might allow for divergences between 
different spheres of justification, so that I can justify myself to myself but not to others. 
Concerning reasons we might speak of a reason for me and a reason for you, and we can 
accept failure to comply with certain reasons as justified by other reasons. We can also accept 
alternative weighing of reasons as justifying. I don’t think this kind of relative justification 
applies to ought. 
                                                 
38 Moral Luck p.23 
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Given that the ought refers not to our normative beliefs but to ought facts, we can 
conceive of our agglomerates as tentative oughts facts, attempts at finding out what the ought 
facts are. The danger of this kind of a view is that the role and authority of an external 
corrective is taken on by collective consent. 
Weighing and non-weighing explanations 
Additionally Broome is opposed to protantism, the view “that every ought fact has a weighing 
explanation”39 and argues that even if ought facts have weighing explanations, meaning that 
they figure in weighing explanations, these ought facts may still “have more significant 
explanations that are not weighing ones.” 
If these oughts are different then we need to say something about the relations between 
them. What do the “more significant explanations that are not weighing ones” do? What is the 
relation between weighing and non-weighing explanations? When an ought fact has both a 
weighing and a more significant non-weighing explanation, what does this imply? 
However, “if you ought to Φ, no doubt there is an explanation of this fact; presumably 
no ought fact is inexplicable. Consequently, there is a perfect reason for you to Φ.”40 But 
perfect reasons may also be pro tanto reasons and a pro tanto reason may also be a perfect 
reason in case it “by itself constitutes an explanation of why you ought to Φ”.41 Whether a 
reason is pro tanto or perfect thereby depends on which kind of explanation it partakes in.  
the fact it is raining explains why you ought to take an 
umbrella; it is a perfect reason for you to take one. 
However, no doubt there is also a fuller, weighing 
explanation of why you ought to take an umbrella. In that 
explanation, the fact it is raining would figure as a reason 
that outweighs contrary reasons. It is therefore a pro tanto 
reason too.42
 The two oughts which I want to keep apart by distinguishing between weighing and 
non-weighing reasons seem therefore to be the same nevertheless, united by the pervasiveness 
of pro tanto reasons.  
                                                 
39 “Reasons” p.13 
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41 “Reasons”, p.12 
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Broome critically examines the “case for thinking that every ought fact has a weighing 
explanation”,43 a view which he calls protantism. What protantism would imply is that there 
are no ought facts without weighing explanations. To counter it Broome tries to come up with 
ought facts that have no weighing explanations. He considers things which you never ought to 
do, such as believe a contradiction, and he considers descriptions which are just not 
weighable, such as the regulations which determine how much tax you ought to pay.  
The clarification of why the explanation of the ought fact that you ought not to believe 
in a contradiction is non-weighing is that “Neither of the facts included in it has a weight that 
plays any part in the explanation, and the explanation does not involve aggregating 
weights.”44 Does this mean that the distinction is descriptive, so that if you explain something 
without involving any weighing nor anything with a weight, then what we are dealing with is 
a non-weighing explanation? And that if we do provide a weighing explanation then there is 
one? If so, does the non-weighing explanation provide any privileged character to that ought 
fact? Does the non-weighing explanation exert any hold over the non-weighing explanation? 
Does it for instance prevent it from being reweighed into the opposite ought? Does it hold the 
ought fact so to speak?  
Reasons not to think so are that perfect reasons may also be pro tanto reasons. And an 
ought without a weighing explanation might have a weighing exlanation at another time, or 
hypothetically. Both these cases seem to give that ought a weighing explanation, even though 
it doesn’t have an actual weighing explanation at the moment. 
 In response to an objection that a pro tanto reason which plays no role in a non-
weighing explanation of why you ought to Φ, because that explanation is a deontic principle, 
may come to play an explanatory role when that deontic principle is cancelled, Broome 
incorporates potential weighing explanations into his definition of a pro tanto reason. Pro 
tanto reasons are therefore not only the reasons which participate in an actual weighing 
explanation of some ought but also the ones that potentially could. In that case one may 
construe the non-weighing explanation in terms of an underlying weighable explanation. It 
seems to me however, that any explanation of this fact then consequently will be a weighing 
explanation since the ought is conditional upon the counter-reasons being very weak at the 
moment (i.e. it is not the case that great benefits will arise from believing a contradiction), so 
that the ought is the aggregation of reasons and the explanation of an aggregated ought is 
weighing. But, this kind of an example might just illustrate the vague passages from one kind 
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of ought to another. Since a pro tanto reason also may be a perfect reason, and in just this kind 
of case where the potential counter-reason does not weigh anything (because the possibility 
that great benefits might arise from believing in a contradiction does not obtain), the pro tanto 
reason in favour of not believing in a contradiction is a perfect reason. What this kind of view 
implies is that whenever you can hypothetically come up with a potential counter-reason to an 
ought, then you have weakened it to an ought with a weighing explanation. The significance 
of this is that if we can think of a hypothetical counter-reason to all oughts then there are no 
strict and detachable oughts which are not susceptible to our weighing. Considering the 
variations in particular situations, this seems to be a likely view to hold, it might be right, but 
it also seems wrong in the respect that what we conclude we ought to do is in fact often not 
something we ought to do. And sometimes the mistake we made was to weigh away a non-
weighing ought.  
Broome claims that his explanations are non-weighing given the pragmatist clause 
containing the potential counter-reason. When it does not obtain there is no reason and so no 
weight whatsoever, then I agree. But in cases where the counter-reason exists, just with a 
minimal weight, this existence makes the explanation a weighing explanation, which seems to 
be the case for the first example Broome presents, “unless these benefits are extremely large, 
the pro tanto reason for you not to believe both outweighs the pr tanto reason for you to 
believe both”.45 And although it seems as if the second example also involves degrees and 
opens for subjective interpretation and weighing of what a sufficiently great good would be, it 
is formulated as a non-weighing explanation.46 Yet Broome admits that there is a weighing 
explanation underlying this non-weighing explanation as well which “will explain the 
conditional normative principle that the non-weighing explanation depends on.”  
On the other hand, the way this issue is set up by Broome is as a disagreement between 
evidentialists and pragmatists. What is at stake is whether “what you ought to believe is 
determined only by considerations that are directly connected with the truth of what you 
believe”47 as the evidentialists hold, or whether the benefits of having certain beliefs can 
constitute reasons for having those beliefs, which is the pragmatist claim. 
So that weighable and non-weighable are properties of content perhaps, and certainly 
not something you can choose either to apply or not. If we can show this then the strict ought 
                                                 
45 “Reasons”, p.14 
46 The explanation is “the tax laws say you owe $12,345; you ought to pay what the tax laws say you owe, unless 
great good would result from your not paying it; but great good would not result from your not paying it; so you 
ought to pay it.” “Reasons”, p.15 
47 “Reasons”, p.13 
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can maintain it’s privileged status while somehow co-existing with a weighing explanation. 
Weighing and non-weighing explanations of the same ought fact will be in agreement about 
the ought fact although they will not be in agreement as to whether the ought fact is 
weighable or not.  
 
Perfect reasons hold a strict aspect since they arise due to our mixing of the non-
normative explanatory reason for an ought fact and that normative ought.  
 “A perfect reason for you to Φ is defined as a fact that explains why you ought to Φ. 
There might be several distinct perfect reasons for you to Φ. This is because the non-
normative explanations which become the perfect reasons are separate facts which we pick 
out to stand for the whole explanation, a complex fact that can be referred to by several 
distinct facts.48 The relation between ought facts and the facts that ground them is therefore 
pluralistic because the facts that ground them are complex facts. Or would this be to confuse 
our explanatory reasons, which we attach to the oughts, with the facts that ground them 
independently of our explanations of them? 
There might be weighable reasons for bombing Hiroshima, but the fact that one ought 
not to bomb Hiroshima is not a pro tanto reason, “a characteristic of any pro tanto reason is 
that it is possible for it to be outweighed”.49 Whether bombing Hiroshima with nuclear 
weapons can take the role of a pro tanto reason according to Broome depends on whether the 
possibility of being outweighed is a descriptive statement, where the fact that it has in praxis 
been outweighed means that it is a pro tanto reason. Broome likens ought facts to perfect 
reasons. “‘You ought to Φ’ and ‘There is a perfect reason for you to Φ’ are equivalent 
statements. “If you have a reason to q, there is some fact that makes this the case. Similarly, if 
you ought to q, there is some fact that makes this the case, too.”50
If I mistakenly presume something to be an ought fact and combine this with an 
explanatory reason which by language use becomes a perfect reason for you to Φ then there is 
no complex fact which my perfect reason picks out, since there is no such ought fact and 
consequently no fact which it is grounded in neither. Subsequently provision of explanation 
does not necessarily guarantee that a normative belief is a true normative belief. 
It seems to me that although perfect reasons are spoken of and used as reasons in our 
common sense of that word, they really belong more to the category of the strict ought in 
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whose service they are than to the category of reasons. Perfect reasons have no normativity of 
their own after all. Separating perfect reasons from pro tanto reasons even more distinctly 
than Broome does is one suggestion for how to maintain reasons’ relations to ought while 
preserving this relation to perfect reasons so that pro tanto reasons and all weighing 
explanations stand in relations to a different kind of ought, which can be the same ought fact, 
but the normativity will be different. This difference is not sufficiently allowed for within 
Broome’s scheme since it is also shown that the same reason can play both the role of a pro 
tanto and a perfect reason. 
the fact it is raining explains why you ought to take an 
umbrella; it is a perfect reason for you to take one. 
However, no doubt there is also a fuller, weighing 
explanation of why you ought to take an umbrella. In that 
explanation, the fact it is raining would figure as a reason 
that outweighs contrary reasons. It is therefore a pro tanto 
reason too.51
But when a perfect reason also may be a pro tanto reason, and “a characteristic of any pro 
tanto reason is that it is possible for it to be outweighed”52, then it seems that perfect reasons 
hold no special force over the ought facts which they explain.  All reasons seem to be 
outweighable and consequently all oughts seem revisable in accordance to our weighing of 
reasons. But perhaps there are examples in which perfect reasons neither are nor can be pro 
tanto reasons as well. A prerequisite for a reason to be both perfect and pro tanto is that the 
ought takes a weighing explanation.  
But when a pro tanto reason which also is a perfect reason is outweighed, then the 
weighing explanation which favoured an ought is no longer in favour of that ought, and so the 
ought no longer exists, and then the explanation of that ought cannot gain normativity from 
the ought which it used to be a perfect reason for since that ought has ceased to be an ought, 
and so the perfect reason ceases to be a perfect reason as well, and thereby we see that perfect 
reasons hold no privileged position concerning oughts. 
Can we imagine the occurrence of a conflict between two oughts within Broome’s 
theory? Won’t the continual adjustment of oughts via reasons assure that one ought subsides 
at the emergence of overriding reasons? If all ought facts may take on weighing explanations 
then I would expect oughts to be adjusted to the fluctuations in existence and weight of 
reasons through time in such a way that conflicting oughts don’t co-exist. But this is a 
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complex question because different ought facts have different weighing explanations which 
may or may not overlap. If they don’t overlap, then the only way in which the preference of 
one ought fact in a specific situation could make the weighing of the conflicting ought change 
so as to cancel that ought is if benefits are reasons. Then the benefit of not complying to the 
conflicting ought would be so great that the agglomerate weigh would not be in favour of that 
ought.  
We have however seen that Broome is opposed to the view that benefits are or give 
reasons. And if benefits don’t give reasons then conflicting oughts will (at least in most cases) 
remain as conflicting oughts. The result then is that one chooses between two oughts and ends 
up doing something one ought to do at the expense of doing something which one ought not 
to do. I think this kind of description is correct, as opposed to descriptions which reduce the 
opposing oughts.  
Conclusion 
The possibility of very strict oughts cannot depend on the absence of weighing explanations. 
If they are to stand a chance they must depend upon something which outconquers any 
potential weighing explanation. But we know that is too much. If these oughts are to stand a 
chance against being weighed away then we must give them that strength by being sensitive 
to them. We are the voice of the oughts so it is in some sense we who make them, and break 
them, and we decide which oughts we want to be ruled by. But this is at the level where right 
and wrong normative beliefs co-exist and disagree. We have seen why these normative beliefs 
are not to be likened with the ought facts. That we live by these normative forces and perhaps 
even massively support them does not convey the normative force of an ought on them. We 
cannot make something an ought by believing in it, and when we intend to act on our 
normative beliefs we do so by the force of a requirement, not because we ought to. The 
normative beliefs which guide us and our societies seem often to pervade by other forces such 
as requirements, power, conventions, mimicking, and various forces of recognition and 
identity. The work that should be done is to distinguish all these kinds of normative forces, 
perhaps we could call them conventional forces, from (ideal) normative forces.  
Conceiving of oughts facts as external, which are in virtue of being detachable, makes 
our normative beliefs and deliberations seem more like attempts at finding our what we 
should do rather than being the standards of rightness themselves. It also permits us to see that 
one person may be right while all the others are mistaken. 
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In addition to non-compliance being a definite failure, which Broome presents as the 
distinguishing mark of strict normativity, I want the strict ought not to be amendable and not 
to be reducible. This seems absurd in praxis where we often both have to and ought to do 
something which otherwise might be considered an ought not.  
In the subsequent parts of this paper I will provide an account of ought which maintains 
stringency in the face of opposing reasons while being epistemically connected to our 
collective deliberation of what we ought to do. The way I want to approach and answer this is 
by keeping the ought ideal and making the conflict practical, so that the limitations don’t 
constitute the reference of that which you ought to do. My point of insistence is that the 
concluding ought differs from the ought which it is a means to. What this objection will show 
is that reasoning to the best means hardly retains the ought in its full form, although it strives 
to do so. The practical restraints between the ideal ought and the practical ought of our 
conclusion impose a distance between these oughts which does not infer ought on the 
practical restraints themselves, but only on the action as an instance of the ideal ought, and 
not on the particularities of the practical ought which are not ideal. 
If the reasoning is to a necessary means then the ought of the conclusion follows by 
requirement. And so in that case the breaking of an ought fact is something you are required 
to do rather than something you ought to do. If the reasoning is to the best means then ones 
defence depends upon having found the best means in a perspective which exceeds the 
individuals. One of the main reasons for this is that it is always possible to think of and do 
something better.  
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The second problem of priority 
Anscombe, Foot, Wolf, and Williams and others object to the hegemony and existence of 
moral obligation, the moral ought. In different ways they claim that this has no ground, is not 
what we ought to do, is no different from conventional oughts. I maintain contrary to them 
and to Broome in “Reasons” that there is such an ought and what we mean by it is precisely 
that it is strict and detachable: it may not be weighed; non-compliance is a strict failure; and it 
applies disregarding your mind states. Truman made the mistake of overlooking an ought fact. 
It is easily done, as they are overshadowed by the more graspable nature of and higher status 
of reasons and requirements. 
Susan Wolf and Bernard Williams claim that what we all things considered ought to do 
may differ from what we are morally obligated to do. Susan Wolf claims that “moral 
perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal well-
being towards which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being 
to strive”.53 Williams argues that “what I am under an obligation to do may not be what, all 
things considered, I ought to do”.54
That morality is not the most important thing in life is pressed from a virtue-ethical 
point of view, but I think Anscombe nicely refutes this kind of argument from the same point 
of view. 
X needs what makes it flourish, so a man needs, or ought 
to perform, only virtuous actions; and even if, as it must 
be admitted may happen, he flourishes less, or not at all, in 
inessentials, by avoiding injustice, his life is spoiled in 
essentials by not avoiding injustice – so he still needs to 
perform only just actions.55
 
What Wolf, Williams, and Foot do which must be answered here is to raise and claim 
other oughts as competitors to the ‘moral’ ought. On the one hand this raises the problem of 
distinguishing my ought from other oughts and on the other hand it raises the problem of 
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defending its priority over other oughts. As Foot says, “The problem is to find proof for this 
further feature of moral judgements [their special dignity and necessity].”56 I will take the 
strategy of repudiation. What they claim as oughts are not oughts in the same sense and 
perhaps not at all.  
Priority 
The priority of these oughts are what distinguish them, and that is what makes the defence of 
them so difficult and their prospects so bleak. They can only be distinguished from the point 
of view which acknowledges them. And perhaps all that can be said in their favour is that 
oughts are only seen from perspectives that are responsive to them, and ‘moral’ oughts are 
distinguished from other so-called oughts in the role they take on from this perspective. We 
all know that from the perspective of an ought this is such that we feel everyone who should 
take note of it but do not are failing to take note of something they ought to take note of. And 
this distinguishes this ought from other things we call ought, such as ‘I ought to practice my 
oboe everyday’. We don’t feel that other people should strive after these oughts. These kinds 
of ought might be mixed up with moral obligation, since oughts that apply particularily to me 
are not transferable in the same way. If I ought to help my grandma, then I don’t feel that the 
same ought applies to everyone else. But it might stem from a more generalized conditional 
such as when your family members are ill and need help you ought to help them. Then 
someone will say that underlying the ought of oboe playing is the conditional if you play the 
oboe you ought to practice everyday. But clearly you are not failing in the same sense if you 
don’t practice your oboe everyday. You can only fail if you want to and are determined to 
become a concerto oboist. And yet even then the failure is not such a big deal. Normativity 
between your goal and a necessary means, such as you ought to see to it that you practice 
everyday if you want to become a great oboe player, is relational and non-detachable. The 
failure which is involved here is a failure to satisfy normative requirements. It doesn’t follow 
that you ought to practice your oboe everyday, but simply that you are required to. I think 
there is sufficient potential in this distinction to separate the strict ougths as being concerned 
with important matters, from other oughts which only seemingly are used in the same way. 
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 Ought and moral obligation 
In beginning to speak about morality I slide from ought to the moral ought as if that were a 
perfectly natural or legitimate transition. Broome explicitly resists such a slide. “I doubt that 
‘ought’ can correctly be used to mean the same as ‘morally ought’. However, if it can, that is 
not how I use it. I do not treat ‘ought’ as a solemn word with moral connotations. I treat it as 
our ordinary, workaday, normative verb.”57 I have already emphasized that I distinguish this 
slack ought which Broome treats of in “Reasons” from the strict ought which is distinguished 
from slack detachable normativity in “Normative Requirements”. Anscombe considered that 
“It may be possible, if we are resolute, to discard the term ‘morally ought’, and simply return 
to the ordinary ‘ought’”.58 Anscombe ends up in that article “describing the advantages of 
using the word ‘ought’ in a non-emphatic fashion, and not in a special ‘moral’ sense; of 
discarding the term ‘wrong’ in a ‘moral’ sense, and using such notions as ‘unjust’.”59 The 
reason why Anscombe suggests a replacement of injustice for morally wrong is that on some 
theories it may be morally right to kill the innocent whereas it will never be just. Therefore 
justice is superior.60 Perhaps enough time has elapsed for the moral ought to have tapered out. 
I certainly don’t claim that people morally ought to do anything. I simply say they ought to, 
ought not to, that something is unjust or just can’t be done. We can perceive ought facts in 
terms of justice, as Catherine Wilson construes them after Mills distinction between moral 
judgements and other judgements as advantage-reducing imperatives. It might seem strange to 
stretch this approach to the kinds of strict oughts which demand that you help someone from 
drowning or drive someone to the hospital. But you are in advantaged position to these 
people, and although their misfortune is not caused by your advantage, the further 
development of their misfortune will be upheld by your advantageous position if you do not 
help them. This indicates a very strict relation between the oughts of states of affairs and a can 
which facilitates specification of that ought to someone in the form of a moral obligation.  
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If the word moral doesn’t do anything then we can just drop it. Some oughts are more 
important than others and have priority in virtue of what they treat of. That might be both 
sufficient and better than calling them moral obligations. 
  
Moral Luck 
I am now going to apply some of Broome’s arguments to Bernard Williams’ argumentation in 
favour of moral luck.  
Bernard Williams considers whether Gauguin’s becoming a renowned painter justifies 
him retrospectively in abandoning his family. The purpose of William’s article is to defend 
and upraise “the limitations to morality”.61 Bernard Williams wants to show that morality is 
not unconditional and not the one basic form of value by showing that the justification of our 
decisions is subject to both external and internal contingency. 
 
Bootstrapping intentions into reasons 
Bernard Williams’ presentation of moral luck can be construed in terms of Broome’s before-
mentioned example of how two incommensurable values can become (subjectively) 
commensurate when the agent makes his choice, on the view that intentions are reasons. 
Gauguin and Williams seem to make these two (possibly) objectively incommensurable 
values of either staying with one’s family and not becoming a great expressionist artist or of 
abandoning his family and (possibly) becoming a great expressionistic artist subjectively 
commensurable by deciding that the former is better. But this betterness relies on the 
possibility that intentions provide reasons which is a presumption that is shown to be wrong 
by the bootstraping objection. “A decision simply does not add to pre-existing reasons.”62 
Therefore such incommensurable values are not made commensurable by ones preference for 
one or the other.  
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Presuming that benefits are reasons 
A second way of construing the Gauguin example in terms of the discussions provided by 
Broome is to see that the benefits of becoming a great artist seem, in Williams’ view, to 
provide a reason for abandoning his family so that the balance no longer speaks in favour of 
staying with his family (his obligations as William puts it). The agglomerate no longer speaks 
in favour of this since the benefits of abandonment are so great. Thereby the ought fact which 
opposes abandonment of one’s family is eliminated.  
If we conceive of the two opposing ought facts as being considered up against each 
other, although I think there is no such ought for becoming a great artist, then we can see that 
what happens in this weighing or consideration is that the same reason is put on both sides, in 
favour of the same effect. It increases the weight in favour of leaving and it decreases the 
weight in favour of staying. The same reason becomes the decisive reason for both ought facts 
thereby reducing the conflict between two ought facts (if we presume that becoming an artist 
is an ought fact) to only one. But this is only the case if benefits provide reasons. Otherwise 
the benefits of abandonment could not participate in the agglomeration of the ought for 
staying with one’s family (provided we accept that agglomerations make oughts) and the 
conflict would remain as a conflict between oughts.  
If pragmatism is wrong, however, then it is not correct to say that benefits of intentions 
are reasons for having those intentions and consequently that the benefits of intending to 
become a great artist give Gauguin a reason to leave his family.  
Williams would probably object that he is defending the justification of abandonment 
retrospectively from the point of view in which Gauguin is a great artist, and not from the 
moment in time when Gauguin made his decision, so it is not a matter of intention. To this I 
would reply, that the benefits of being a great artist are still used as counter-balance to the 
ought which Gauguin has forsaken so as to weigh heavier than it and therefore justify his 
abandonment. And these benefits are provided by his intention to do so.  
I agree that we can change the balance of pro tanto reasons through time. That is 
definitely something we both do and ought to do. But I do not think that bootstrapping can be 
overcome by stretching out time. The effects of an intention are still the benefits of that 
intention despite the fact that they now exist on their own and are not hypothesized via the 
intention.  
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Just a requirement 
Alternatively Williams’ argument might be seen as following by requirement, via intention or 
normative belief, to the conclusion that he ought have abandoned his family. But we have 
already seen that no detachable normative conclusion is available, and if we do construe the 
argument in terms of intentional reasoning to a necessary means then the conclusion would 
follow by requirement and would not imply that we ought to intend it.   
 
Non-reduction 
I think that whatever reasons or benefits there are for becoming a great artist still leave 
Gauguin with the failure of having abandoned his family. Why do we have to level out these 
seemingly incommensurate values? Why can’t we just leave it at the inclusive description 
which maintains that Gauguin did something he ought not to have done and also something he 
ought to have done? Although I don’t see the ought in becoming a great artist. Becoming a 
great painter is a kind of positive contribution which one can’t be blamed for not providing. 
Deserting one’s family is however the active doing of a wrong and clearly blameworthy 
whether it also leads to something good or not. 
Why can’t we then say that Gauguin did something he ought not to have done for the 
sake of or but also did something good? I don’t think it is right to reduce or eliminate wrongs 
because they have led to or been combined with the accomplishment of good, even if the 
wrong was necessary for the good. Williams does draw a line somewhere between what is a 
candidate for luck and what is not. “The trustee is not entitled to gamble with the infants’ 
money even if any profits will certainly go to the infants, and success itself will not remove, 
or start to remove, that objection.”63 Where and what is the limit between these things? When 
can some other good justify the trespassing of an ought and when can it not? Williams’ 
essential distinction between the potentially justifiable and the unconditionally unjustifiable 
seems to be that “The outcome has to be substantial in a special way – in a way which 
importantly conditions the agent’s sense of what is significant in his life, and hence his 
standpoint of retrospective assessment.”64
 People who approve of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki seem to do so in line 
with Williams’ construal of moral luck. They presume that these bombings ended the Second 
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World War and that this outcome justified a bombing which normally would not have been 
justified. This outcome might qualify as substantial in that special way from some people’s 
points of view, but certainly not for others’. Williams makes his distinction in the context of 
discussing why an agent should be “retrospectively concerned with the rationality of his 
decision, and not just with its success.”65 Williams seems to think that the agent will be just as 
contented with his deliberation as long as he succeeded. But I can see good reason to regret 
the deliberation which led one to decide to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki although the action 
described as a means to end the world war was successful. I think Williams agrees with me, 
that this bombing is not justified by luck, depending on whether criticism by other persons is 
“offered where they had a grievance”66 although I don’t think this should be a criterion.  
Williams claims of agents who have ‘gambled’ with justification that “Whatever 
feelings these agents had after their decision, but before the declaration of their success or 
failure, lacked the fully-developed wish to have acted otherwise – that wish comes only when 
failure is declared.”67 Success or failure concerning ought seems however to be a matter 
which depends to a large degree upon description. Elizabeth Anscombe criticizes Kant and 
Mill for having failed to “realize the necessity for stipulation as to relevant descriptions”68, 
because acts of murder and theft can be otherwise described. Conversely, Williams is guilty 
of applying the relativity of description in favour of a relative ought. The bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki has many descriptions. It can be described as the end of the world 
war, the beginning of the cold war, as mass murder, as scientific experimenting.  
The strict and detachable ought would facilitate that ought facts obtain independently of 
our descriptions of them, but will it prevent conflicting ought facts from arising? In this case 
the only positive ought, of ending the world war, is an ought fact which does not pick out nor 
stand in any normative relation to bombing Hiroshima.  
 “What we all things considered ought to do” 
Beyond the theory of moral luck which is meant to show that the ought of obligation 
competes with and may not ought above other oughts, which are not obligations, and not 
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concerned with moral values, Williams provides further obstacles by in some sense conflating 
the moral ought with the practical ought. I exaggerate when I say that he conflates them, but 
in effect that is partly what he does. This is problematic because the practical ought is on 
Williams’ account implies “possibility, will be exclusive, and will be relative to the projects 
of the agent in question.”69 This is obviously a different ought than the strict ought. Williams 
also speaks of it apart from the moral ought, but his practical ought hardly leaves any room 
for such a strict ought. I am going to consider two ways in which Williams raises the position 
of the practical ought. The first is by denying a logical distinction between oughts so that the 
oughts which are universally applicable are the same oughts as particular oughts which are 
not applicable to others. The second way is by claiming that the must of ‘moral obligation’ is 
the same as the must of the practical ought. I am going to leave the consideration of must for 
the next chapter. 
 ‘This is what I ought to do’ expresses the agent’s 
recognition of the course of action appropriate, all things 
considered, to the reasons, motives, and constraints that he 
sees as bearing on the situation. The sense of that 
conclusion is what gives the sense to the questions it 
answers, ‘What ought I to do?’70
That the answer is what gives sense to the question is in one sense evident since what 
wants answer is what I ought to do in this particular situation, given what restraints there are 
on the situation, and what the situation is. Yet the way in which we strive towards the limit of 
the restraints, how we strive to be as unlimited as possible in face of that which we ought to 
do cannot be explained without recourse to another unrestrained (or less restrained) ought. In 
striving to find out “what I all things considered ought to do” I imagine or aim towards this 
answer in my own limited consideration of a limited amount of considerations. I fact I storm 
my brain for further considerations. We try to get at what we ought to do by transgressing our 
own limits. We often say I think this is what I ought to do, or as far as I can see this is what I 
ought to do, because we know the answer to be limited by us, and because we know that the 
question is asked with a view to something unlimited. In reasoning to the best means, we are 
in effect trying to unlimit ourselves so as to uncover what we ought to do. We are however 
limited by both unavoidable and avoidable limitations concerning time, mental capacity, 
personality, and the mind states we already have.  
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The “all things considered” of the first premise may be taken to mark the best possible 
judgement as it would be taken from the ideal unrestrained perspective of the all-knowing 
benevolent thinker who can think everything at once. In praxis what we conclude that we 
ought to do is based upon all the things I have considered, and Williams raises the status of 
this ought by claiming that it was all I could. 
But if the span between the unrestricted and the restricted ought is unaccounted for then 
the normativity of the restricted ought does not partake in the normativity of the ideal ought 
but rather takes on a conventional normativity. 
Given that I could only save one of two people it does not follow that I ought only to 
have saved one of them. It remains the case that I ought to save both but since I couldn’t I had 
to let one of them drown. Another example is that the second world war ought to have been 
ended and if we have enough or little enough imagination to believe that Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima had to be bombed with nuclear weapons, then that does still not mean that they 
ought to have been bombed.  
Bernard Williams does not agree with Gilbert Harman that there are different logical 
forms of ought. This is part of his argumentation in favour of a sort of conflation between the 
premise and concluding ought. 
The occurrence of ought in (5) [Someone ought to help 
that old lady] is as a propositional operator, and it is hard 
to see what requires it, or even allows it, to turn into 
something else in (6) [Jones ought to help that old lady].71
The change from the first premise to the conclusion is from an ought which represents a 
property of a state of affairs, to the ought of moral obligation which according to Harman is a 
property of the agent and therefore does not sustain a correspondence between active and 
passive sentences. According to Harman these two oughts differ in their logical properties. 
Whereas the ought of states of affairs is equivalent under the active/passive transform of 
“Jones ought to have examined Smith” and “Smith ought to have been examined by Jones”72, 
the ought which represents a relation between an agent and a possible course of action is not. 
Williams does not agree that the ought which prescribes a certain action to a specific person 
may differ in structure from the ought describing states of affairs. This is part of Williams’ 
argumentation in favour of “the unitary structure of ought”73 which would show that “there is 
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no reason to regard the ought of moral obligation as anything but a propositional operator”,74 
meaning that the ought of moral obligation is the same as the ought which represents states of 
affairs. 
This is what constitutes and defends what I like to exaggeratedly refer to as Williams’ 
conflation of the moral and practical ought. Contrary to this I think it is important that we 
maintain the distinction described by Harman, “there are at least two different uses of ought 
with different logical properties.”75 The reason why I think we ought to keep this is so that we 
can see ought in terms of states of affairs, arising from facts as Broome’s ought facts, and 
distinguish this from another use of ought which prescribes independently of states of affairs. 
I wish to agree with Williams in that ought is the kind of propositional operator which can 
derive a property of an agent that transfers a general ought statement into a specific ought 
statement, as in the quoted example. The importance is that this must only occur from oughts 
concerning states of affairs and should not transfer in the other direction. The transference 
must be facilitated by the fact that the ought is a propositional operator of states of affairs. 
That moral obligation does not transfer from passive to active remains to be the case. So that 
although the ought in “Somebody ought to sweep this room” takes the same form as the ought 
in “Jones ought to sweep this room”, that this room ought to be swept by Jones is not the 
same as this room ought to be swept by someone. This room ought to be swept by someone is 
equivalent in both its active and passive forms, but the specified ought statement is not 
equivalent to its passive form.  
The importance and correctness of this may be seen from examples of both reasoning to 
necessary means and especially from examples of reasoning to the best means.  
 
Reasoning to the best means 
Let us consider the example that the Second World War ought to be ended. The ought is a 
propositional operator transferable between active and passive sentences, when we subscribe 
it generally. “The Second World War ought to be ended by someone” and “someone ought to 
end the Second World War” are equivalent statements. Somebody takes it upon themselves to 
do so, and clearly they are then doing something they ought to do. But what precisely ought 
they to do? And how does the ought transfer to the specification of what they ought to do?  
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I think Williams is right in that this can be extended in some sense to who ought to end 
it, but it can not be extended to how they ought to end it. By deliberation we consider how we 
ought to end it and we conclude that if we bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki with nuclear 
weapons the war will end. This is not a belief in necessary means since they obviously could 
have bombed other cities or done something completely different. But let us presume that we 
think this is the best means to end the war. We have good reason to believe the war will come 
to end if we drop these nuclear weapons and we might also have other good reasons to do so. 
What kind of an ought is applicable to this conclusion? 
Because practical and theoretical reasoning (intention and belief reasoning respectively) 
follow different attitudes towards truth, the first truth-taking and the latter truth-giving, and 
since it is the attitudes which require you to draw the conclusion, John Broome concludes 
that, “when we move away from necessary means, intention reasoning and belief reasoning 
diverge […] the former is concerned with the best way of making the end true, and the latter 
with the most likely way the end will be true.”76 Reasoning to the best means is therefore not 
subordinated to the principle of a normative requirement but to some other principle which 
according to Broome “remains to be worked out”.77  
Sometimes we reason with normative beliefs about means as the second premise. We 
might believe that if we intend to end the war we ought to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
The conclusion we would then be required to draw is that we ought to bomb these cities. 
Broome considers the possibility of this kind of reasoning and refutes it. “These conditionals 
with a normative consequent are not in general true, and could not be supported by a general 
process of correct reasoning.”78 Even if this did qualify for reasoning and you were 
normatively required to draw the conclusion it would not be detachable, and we could not 
conclude that you ought to do it. We have already seen that this is what distinguishes 
detachable and non-detachable normativity. “No detachable normative conclusion is 
available, and hence no material conditional proposition such as the content of [B(If Chris 
intends to buy a boat, Chris ought to borrow money)].”79 Believing a conditional does not 
make it true. 
This distinction between detachable and non-detachable normativity can be clarified by 
seeing that “If you have a reason to q, there is some fact that makes this the case. Similarly, if 
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you ought to q, there is some fact that makes this the case, too.”80 If you have a requirement to 
(intent to) q, however, there is a mind state that makes this true.  
Broome concludes that “instrumental reasoning is definitely not to be interpreted as 
normative reasoning.”81 But surely we ought to do the best we can. But it seems from 
Broome’s point of view that the oughts we conclude from deliberation neither follow by 
requirement nor by that we ought to do them.  
Reasoning to necessary means 
When we reason to necessary means, either theoretically or practically, we are required 
to draw the conclusion. But as we have seen this only follows by requirement and does not 
imply that we ought to believe or intend it. 
Moral saints 
In her indictment of moral saints Susan Wolf claims that “moral perfection, in the sense of 
moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal well-being towards which it would 
be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive.”82 Susan Wolf has 
already here in the premise to her article presumed that we aim towards personal well-being, 
and should, according to what’s rational, good, or desirable aim towards personal well-being. 
And this presumption seems to be made in a way which perceives of the individual as 
somehow detached from the well-being of other people. For on my intuition moral concern 
for others is an integrated component of personal well-being, and this is not because I find it 
rational or desirable or good to obtain moral perfection, or for any other reason have set 
myself the goal of attaining moral perfection, but because I don’t feel well about myself if I 
ignore the moral concerns which I respond to. The important distinction here is between what 
I respond to and what I don’t. When I notice that something is wrong, is injust or in some 
other sense not as it ought to be, then I feel that I ought to do something. Sometimes I cannot 
conceive of any way in which I could do anything and so I don’t do anything, I feel that the 
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matter is for someone else to handle. Wolf construes the distinction between moral concern 
and moral action at the wrong level between noticing an ought and being concerned with it. It 
is as if I first notice moral concerns and then decide, or act according to what I’ve already 
decided, as to whether I want to respond to these or not. What she fails to notice is that when I 
respond to moral concerns this brings about a reaction in me, which might result in action or 
not depending on several factors which may also say something about how moral I am, but 
which implies my concern about the matter. (If I simply take note of some fact without seeing 
it as a moral concern then I have not noticed a moral concern, so noticing a moral concern is 
to notice a certain fact with a certain normative attitude.) I therefore think it is more correct to 
perceive the distinction between moral saints and other less moral people as a distinction 
between people who are highly sensitive to moral concerns and people who are less so. One 
may decide to become more responsive to such matters, but besides that the distinction does 
not run between people who have different higher goals in life. The moral saint is very highly 
responsive to injustice and other moral concerns and notices further concerns than other 
people who are therefore more complacently left to busy themselves with other matters.  
Concerning Wolf’s argument we might also say that the conclusion follows by 
requirement from the premises which she provides. That we ought not to be moral saints is 
not something to argue for or against. Any conclusion which follows will do so by 
requirement and may or may not be something we ought to believe.  
In advocating the development of these varieties of 
excellence [The feats of Groucho Marx, Reggie Jackson, 
and the head chef at Lutèce], we advocate non-moral 
reasons for acting, and in thinking that it is good for a 
person to strive for an ideal that gives a substantial role to 
the interests and values that correspond to these virtues, 
we implicitly acknowledge the goodness of ideals 
incompatible with that of the moral saint. Finally, if we 
think that it is as good, or even better for a person to strive 
for one of these ideals than it is for him or her to strive for 
and realize the ideal of the moral saint, we express a 
conviction that it is good not to be a moral saint.83
 
To conceive of the moral ought as a rival of other kinds of oughts or values is to 
misconceive the relation between them. Wolf presumes that the dedication to a higher goal is 
a prerequisite for being subordinated to moral oughts. As if we make a choice of whether we 
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want to dedicate ourselves to being a moral saint or focus on other virtues, and as if people 
who do aim at being highly moral sit around in anticipation of moral ougths to arise and never 
do anything else which is not entirely moral. Oughts follow by requirement on Wolf’s view 
since they are relational to one’s higher goals. What she fails to take into account is that 
oughts of the strict kind appear once in a while and even the most dedicated concert oboist 
will put his oboe down whenever in order to rescue someone from dying or whatever it may 
be.  
What seems to be true of anyone who is describable as not being a moral saint is the 
refusal or failure to accept known ought facts. Since we cannot say of anyone that they fail to 
comply to unknown ought facts, but only to the ones we know of or believe in. Anyone’s lack 
of morality then (judged of by someone else) is lacking in comparison to the normative 
content in other people’s minds, not in relation to ought facts conceived of independently of 
anybody’s belief in them, although that kind of situation can seemingly arise when that which 
we judge of is at a different moment in time. A case where normative beliefs which we have 
but nobody had at that time are the basis on which we judge him as lacking in these normative 
beliefs which we presume to have been true normative facts in the past as well although 
nobody (hypothetically) was aware of them. Although believing something to be right does 
usually seem to involve the belief that it has always been true, and whether our present 
normative beliefs are true or false, we could believe them to always have been true as an 
effect of believing them.  
Rules of etiquette 
Precisely the contrast to Williams’ relative practical ought is what I take strict and detachable 
to imply. But Philippa Foot points out that the same non-relative application goes for club 
rules and the likes.   
we find ‘should’ used non-hypothetically in some non-
moral statements to which no one attributes the special 
dignity and necessity conveyed by the description 
‘categorical imperative’. For instance, we find this non-
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hypothetical use of ‘should’ in sentences enunciating rules 
of etiquette84
 
I can suggest a few common sensical reasons against this claim. First of all I think 
anyone can see the contingency of rules of etiquette in comparison to moral oughts. But this 
might just be a contemporary and perhaps geographically limited phenomenon as rules of 
etiquette seem to be dying out along with the dispersal of distinct classes. Foot also concedes 
that “moral rules are often enforced much more strictly than the rules of etiquette, and our 
reluctance to press the non-hypothetical ‘should’ of etiquette may be one reason why we think 
of the rules of etiquette as hypothetical imperatives.” Imperialistically minded Europeans 
have regarded divergent cultures as primitives for not recognizing European rules of etiquette. 
They obviously did not possess the common sensical distinction between what’s important 
and what isn’t, precisely because they used their own identification with certain conventions 
as a way of establishing their own power over those who lacked it.  
Additionally club rules and rules of etiquette are contingent in an empirically 
observable matter. They vary from place to place, and very strict oughts might be 
distinguished on the grounds that they are observed everywhere. (Sometimes there are 
exceptions which have conventional explications.) Additionally any club-member knows that 
club rules are contingent in this way since the rules may change and he might even be 
wanting to change a rule or two.  
In connection to this we might point out that a club rule does not emerge from states of 
affairs, they cannot possibly exist independently of anybody’s knowledge. But then the 
question we encounter is whether the facts that ought facts are grounded in must be states of 
affairs which obtain independently of anybody’s mind, or whether they can’t also be beliefs in 
some people’s minds. 
Within a group which adheres to rules of etiquette we can see counterfactually that the 
conventions are non-detachable. When rules of etiquette suddenly change, conformity to the 
previous and passé trend might be considered abhorrent, it has become an ought-not. This 
shows that the truth of some specific rule or convention is conditional upon its pervasiveness. 
Whether the ought fact obtains depends then not simply upon whether some fact is the case in 
the world, but whether some rule is considered as the rule, perhaps by certain people in a 
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certain place. The implies that the truth conditions don’t exist detached from praxis but are 
intricately related to praxis.  
Law-based obligation 
Elizabeth Anscombe says of the “’I ought (i.e.) am morally obliged” that “this notion of 
obligation is a notion which only operates in the context of law.”85 The ought which I want to 
defend is however not decreed by any such law but is the employment of one’s moral 
capacity. You don’t need a God in order to have a law, most people are essentially law-
upholding and obedient people and they make conventional laws in the absence of other laws. 
(Christian laws were perhaps defended along the lines of a convention. And dispersed along 
the lines of a convention.)  
The difference which makes the normativity of rules of etiquette and the likes seem of a 
non-relational kind is that it is not dependent upon the mind states of one individual, it is not 
conditional upon your acquiescence to and belief in the rules, but is conditional upon the 
groups collective acquiescence to and belief in the rules. If a conditional and its antecedent 
circulate in a group then you are taken by the members of that group, who uphold the rules or 
conformity to the group as premises, to be guilty of not conforming to the consequent even if 
you personally don’t agree or concede to the convention. This is to stretch a requirement 
beyond the domain in which it requires. Lewis says of conventions that  
Any convention is, by definition, a norm which there is 
some presumption that one ought to conform to. […] it is 
also, by definition, a socially enforced norm: one is 
expected to conform, and failure to conform tends to 
evoke unfavourable responses from others.86
The rules of a game or a club or etiquette fit very well into Lewis’ definition of a 
convention which also entails more specifically that 
conventions may be a species of norms: regularities to 
which we believe one ought to conform. […] There are 
certain probable consequences implied by the fact that an 
action would conform to a convention […] which are 
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presumptive reasons, according to our common opinions, 
why that action ought to be done.87
In order to say something about how conventional normativity differs from that of a 
strict ought I may point out that if one person is playing a game differently from everyone 
else then there is reason to believe that he is not playing by the rules even if these eventually 
change in accordance to the rules which he is playing by. A person who has diverging moral 
views cannot be said in the same way to have had the wrong views until the others took on 
her views. Concerning the game we can hold that there were two sets of rules. We cannot in 
the same way hold that there are two sets of (contradictory) correct normative views 
concerning moral matters. The point of difference is that whereas the rules of a game stand in 
a specific relation to the way the game is played, so that when it is played differently the rules 
are changed or another way of playing is invented, ought facts stand in no such relation to our 
normative beliefs. The most pervasive or socially accepted normative beliefs do not invent a 
new set of ought facts. (Although Catherine Wilson claims something very near to that.) 
Antigone provides an illustration of this. Antigone firmly defends and carries out her 
conviction that justice demands burial for her brother against Creon’s decree to leave him to 
rot unmourned. This opposition to the state law culminates with her death which she must go 
to “as she has lived, alone, without a word of approval or a helping hand from men or gods.”88 
Despite this the readers or audience of the play know, at least eventually, that Antigone is 
rightfully defending justice. If the readers or the audience gradually come to realize this, as 
they might have in ancient times, then they will also realize that Antigone was right all along. 
She was right even when they thought she was mistaken.  
And yet we could see her rightness as conditional upon approval from the masses or the 
head political authority in the sense that conviction of rightness stands in a certain relation to 
belief, which I have considered. But this kind of rightness does not change the truth of a 
normative belief. Her sister, Ismene, called Antigone “wild, irrational”89 and asked “Why rush 
to extremes? It’s madness, madness.”90 These proclamations illustrate or indicate the way in 
which rationality and sanity are tied to accepted and standard behaviour and beliefs, the kind 
of consent by average people which Catherine Wilson suggests as the standard for true 
normative beliefs. When Ismene and the others come to see the rightness of Antigone’s 
beliefs, attitudes and actions they will probably also come to see her as rational. But will they 
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consequently come to see themselves as previously having been irrational? Probably not, 
seems almost impossible to do so.  
Gilbert Harman also presents occurrence of the same sense of ought (the sense of moral 
obligation) applied to rules of etiquette and the likes. But Harman presents this more 
particularly as obtaining “when it is said that someone has reasons to do something relative to 
rules of law, club rules, conventions of etiquette, rules of a game, and so forth, which the 
speaker takes the agent to accept.”91 Harman continues that the speaker will not consider his 
statement mistaken and withdraw it if the agent does not accept the rules or conventions 
referred to.  
At bottom the difference seems to be between having reasons to do something relative 
to laws of some sort, obeying established ought, and the provision of reasons and ougths 
without reference to rules or laws as the justifying normative force. Anscombe says that the 
term morally wrong comes from “‘what there is an obligation not to do’”92 in a sense of 
obligation where “what obliges is the divine law – as rules oblige in a game.” 
I think it is precisely in the absence of or rebuttal of the law-giver and an established 
law that morality finds place. Nevertheless I insist on a higher ought. This might seem a little 
paradoxical. Wolf, Williams and Wilson want to limit morality and think that the standard is 
provided by that which we believe to be right . I think the ought is provided by the direction 
of ought, a direction which is provided by the practical ought’s approaching of the unlimited 
ought. If we conceive of this in terms of the complex fact which Broome says we can refer to 
by lots of different distinct facts, we can conceive of an ought being approached as we 
uncover further distinct facts about it, as we first saw slavery as wrong, then segregation, and 
now racism.  
I think there is a fundamental difference between believing something to be right and 
believing something to be right in reference to established rules. In respect to that which is 
established as right you don’t have to come up with any justification. The establishment is 
taken as justification, both for doing and for prescribing.  
If one finds an established rule to be right for other reasons than that of being 
established, then the having of this normative belief differs significantly from that of having it 
simply because it occupies a certain normative position in society. Two people may judge, 
believe or act identically and yet do these things either morally or conventionally. As 
McDowell interprets Aristotle, “It is the involvement of practical wisdom that distinguishes 
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the excellences of character, strictly so called, from mindless behavioral propensities that 
might (perhaps only roughly) correspond with them in behavioral output (VI.13).”93  
Contrasted to a grave situation anyone might see that conventions are conventions. You 
don’t uphold good etiquette in case of fire or murder, although some people stringently 
maintain conventional lifestyles rather than making the changes in their daily lives that are 
necessary in order for wrongs on the other side of the globe to be righted. Such cases are 
however intervened by lack of imagination, since the direct relation between one’s own 
lifestyle and unjust causal consequences or prerequisites of this lifestyle in far away areas of 
the world might be completely out of sight and mind. But they also occur right in front of us 
sometimes when a convention interferes in our view of the world, as for example when we 
don’t see beatings of black men as being wrong because we don’t regard them as people one 
should care about. But we can activate a sensitivity towards that which we don’t care about. 
We can come to see beatings of black men as wrong, and we can come to see beating of 
animals as wrong, and eating of animals. We can also turn this kind of sensitivity off. We can 
decide to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki when we feel that we have reason to do so.  
Catherine Wilson and Susan Wolf argue explicitly in favour of limiting this kind of 
sensitivity. I agree that it is sometimes necessary to limit our sensitivity, and where it is 
lacking this often has biological explanations. It would be absurd for Eskimos to refuse to eat 
fish, absurd to imagine it even since they don’t have any other livestock. But sometimes the 
lack of sensitivity is conventional and seems more like a sensitivity blockade which plays the 
role of power maintenance. This might also have a biological explanation but it does not 
qualify as necessary in the same way, and does thereby not obtain the same sense of 
justification either.  
Conceding that there are normative forces between individuals in a society we must 
concede a third normative force which is conditional upon a certain social validity, which is 
conditional upon the consent or conformity of a certain group of individuals, perhaps in the 
way Lewis accounts for conventions. This will be a second type of non-detachable 
normativity, so that we have both an individual and a collective sub-group of non-detachable 
normativity. But the collective one clearly doesn’t provide requirements. It might if anything 
qualify as a recommendation and in that case provides a slack form for normativity which is 
the weakest of all. Perhaps we can presume that if no normative forces ought or require or 
                                                 
93 John McDowell: “Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle’s Ethics” in (ed.) Stephen Engstrom and 
Jennifer Whiting Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, Cambridge UP 1996, pp.19-
35, p.20 
 51 
 
reason you otherwise, it is recommended that you adhere to the customs of your society. But, 
given that this category of recommendation is non-detachable in the sense of a normative 
requirement it will only apply to those who know the convention. The tendency to refer to 
conformity to norms as rational is thereby accounted for by Broome since this normative 
force also partly constitutes rationality (although in the weakest –if no other forces oppose it- 
form for normativity). 
 
 
Normativity versus causality 
We often conform to or follow conventions without knowing that we do so. We just follow 
without really deliberating about what to believe or judge or decide, although we might seem 
to make or at least claim a judgement. Can this kind of determination be called normativity, 
and how does it differ from causality or causal determination? 
According to Lewis a convention requires the existence of an alternative. The existence 
of an alternative is contingent upon knowledge of it, so that something may be a convention 
for some people and not for others.  
What is not conventional among narrow-minded and 
inflexible people, who would not know what to do if 
others began to behave differently, may be conventional 
among more adaptable people. What is not conventional 
may become conventional when news arrives of aliens 
who behave differently; or when somebody invents a new 
way of behaving, even a new way no one adopts.94
 Does this mean that the convention as followed by narrow-minded people who know of no 
alternatives, not normative either, but simply a causal force?  
In certain perspectives of freedom and determination we may say that the forces which 
compel us to think and act as we do are all both normative and causal, depending on which 
perspective we take in our description. But the interesting aspect of freedom and 
determination is that a person may distinguish within himself, presumably within the same 
perspective, between normative and causal forces that guide his life. In making this 
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distinction the essence of the normative forces would be that he contributes to them an 
element of deliberation and decision which is absent from his causal behaviour. (Not just 
between success and failure to act in correspondence to his deep self, since one may fail to do 
so by incorrect reasoning, by bad memory etc., and then one blames ones reasoning, not 
causal influence.) Freedom seems to be tied up to seeing alternatives, to coming to see 
alternatives, and determinism to the lack of alternatives. That something may be a lack of an 
alternative can be both because the person hasn’t thought of it and that he includes it in 
deliberation but can’t act on it. That both these restrictions are restrictions to one’s freedom I 
shall say something about in the next chapter.  
Here is an example of causal influence presented by Lewis. “Jones is wearing beige ties 
because he likes the color; but unknown to him, his tastes are caused by the prevailing fashion 
and will change with it.”95 In Anna Karenina the same description is applied to opinions.  
Stepan Arkadyich subscribed to and read a liberal 
newspaper, not an extreme one, but one with the tendency 
to which the majority held. And though neither science, 
nor art, nor politics itself interested him, he firmly held the 
same views on all these subjects as the majority and his 
newspaper did, and changed them only when the majority 
did, or, rather, he did not change them, but they 
themselves changed imperceptibly in him.96
This kind of unknown imitation of opinions is quite evident in all circles of society. 
Even philosophers may be seen to cling to views which are supported in a certain way in this 
unaware imitational manner. But how can we say that this is the way in which they have or 
attain opinions and deny that they have chosen these opinions on their own in some 
presumably better way? And is this just one kind of (causal) description which also has a 
normative or internal description?  
If belief were more than imitation then we would expect Stepan to maintain his views 
until he saw good reason to cancel them. It is however difficult to either affirm or deny that 
Stepan changes views because of good reasons or because of his own reasons. Everyone who 
shares his views, including the newspaper, probably change their beliefs at about the same 
time and there are undoubtedly reasons involved. There might emerge good reasons for 
everyone to change their minds and they might change their minds because of these reasons.  
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Luckily in this case Stepan has explicitly been presented as not changing his views 
himself, but as having views that change “imperceptibly in him”. I would however not expect 
Stepan to experience his changing views in this way. He will uphold them with conviction 
and will also believe that he decides for himself what to believe. Either way, whether he is 
unaware of which beliefs he has and when and why they change, or whether he believes 
himself to be controlling them, the difference will not be locatable within first person point of 
view. 
What then is the difference between doing x with normative and causal force? Is there a 
difference or just different levels of explanation?  
The normativity of a normative requirement lies in correct reasoning, which is a process 
that occurs through time. Imitation and diffusion are also compliances to norms that occur 
over time. Are these normative? Diffusion only qualifies as normative if the norm that is 
conformed to may be the description of a norm or scientific law. Imitation may qualify as 
normativity if the conformity to some norm does not have to be intentional, or even 
conscious.  
Just because something happens doesn’t mean it had to happen or ought to have 
happened. Isn’t this as applicable to events in nature as much as it is to actions and 
deliberations? One moment in time seems to demand something of the next moment in time. 
Does reasoning, or normative requirements, differ from causality in this?  
Our reasoning can be accused of having gone otherwise than it should have. And then 
we may do it again the way we should’ve done it. Actions can also be wrong in this sense, we 
failed to follow some standard or in some other way ought not to have done what we did. And 
we can try to recompense for that. This aspect of our compliance to normativity as being 
stretched through time is quite significant in that we can make right or better that which we 
have done wrong. An occurrence at one moment in time is in that sense not a secluded event 
at that moment in time but at least also a part of  a normative agenda which does not exhibit 
it’s final form at that moment of time, but may be revised, completed, deleted, or in any other 
way continued through time.  
May not events in nature also go wrong? May not a baby mouse be born as it ought not 
to be? As Elizabeth Anscombe suggests norms as being related to some general standard such 
as “a man has so many teeth, which is certainly not the average number of teeth men have, but 
is the number of teeth for the species, […], a complete set of teeth is a norm.”97 We may get 
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false teeth in order to match this norm, but besides that it is not really a norm we try to live up 
to, or so we might think. But there are incidents which one ought to avoid solely for the 
purpose of keeping our teeth. One ought not to fall face down on the ice or never brush one’s 
teeth. Similarly our species has a norm for how many arms and legs we have and what kind of 
a proportion they stand in to the rest of our bodies. These proportions can be altered by certain 
kinds of medication which one consequently ought not to take.   
How does this kind of conformity to a norm or standard differ from conformity to 
norms of rationality? 
Does it make sense to say that spring normatively summons summer or that one ought 
to get older and eventually die? As a description of that which ineluctably happens this seems 
futile or perhaps wrong, a different sense of “ought”. As Broome points out, “This word can 
sometimes be used non-normatively. For example, suppose you ought to be exhausted by now 
– the ‘ought’ in that sentence is non-normative.”98 This ought refers to expected or usual, 
causal occurrences. When I would expect you to be exhausted and you’re not I say non-
normatively that you ought to be exhausted by now as I say non-normatively that we ought to 
have spring by now.  
However, there are also instances in which I say normatively that we ought to have 
spring by now, and that certain elderly Hollywood stars ought to look a little more aged. This 
normative sense of an ought refers to situations where the expected occurrence of causal 
processes abstain or is threatened to abstain, just like the case where you’re not exhausted 
from running. Yet it is the human intentional intervention in these causal processes we object 
to and the objection is normative.  
But where does our epistemological limit enter here and what role does it play? When 
we know the reasons for deformity, such as a certain medication or the local nuclear power 
plant, then we say normatively that it ought not to have happened. Don’t we presume even 
when there is no known reason for a deformity that there is one and that it still ought not to 
have happened? And why shouldn’t this apply to mice babies as well as to human babies? 
When we say of a newborn mouse that it ought not to be like it is we say this in comparison to 
the norm of a mouse, and what we may mean, at least in some cases, is that something is 
wrong in the normative sense of ought. The difference between saying this normatively and 
non-normatively rests perhaps on whether I care about mice, as the difference between those 
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who take a descriptive and a normative point of view on global warming depends on whether 
they care about certain things or not.  
Broome explains the reasoning relation, between a reason and the fact that grounds it, in 
terms of a material conditional with determination added. This determination “is roughly 
analogous to causation.”99 Normativity arises as we may or may not respond to these ought 
facts. Since we don’t stand in causal relations to reasons and ought facts we stand in some 
other kind of relation in which contact or response may or may not take place, and whereas 
the explanation of the failure to do so often seems purely causal, the appeal to do so is 
normative. Detachable normativity therefore seems to be dependent upon our responsiveness 
and sensitivity. 
Conclusion 
“Moral judgements are normative, but so are judgements of manners, statements of club rules, 
and many others.”100 If there is no external corrective then we might have to coalesce to the 
relativism and subjectivism which incorporates all conventions, rules of etiquette, and so on 
into the form of an ought fact. But we don’t have to accept that that means that they are ought 
facts. Simply we must distinguish between them. Our own deliberations and weighings of 
reasons taken together with collective deliberations and weighings, as well as collective 
disagreement and agreement might then be the only tangible corrective forces for 
distinguishing between true and false normative propositions and sorting out the importance 
of them. Given this scenario the problem is how can one person prove to the masses that he is 
right and the others wrong unless they see that themselves? Unfortunately, which judgement 
is seen as right and which reasons are taken to be the most compelling etc. is often decided by 
forces which are other than sensitivity to the concerns of others and to rightness and justice. 
Often these forces are such that those who are guided by them are unaware of being guided by 
them. This is a grave consideration which theoreticians who level normativity out to the 
collective arena of discussion should take serious account of.  
In the end the second problem of priority boils down to the first problem of priority, if 
we concede that the competing oughts really are other normative forces, such as requirements, 
reasons and recommendations. If we don’t concede to this then I hope to distinguish it 
nevertheless by attaching it to freedom. 
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Freedom and determination 
In his introduction to Antigone Bernard Knox writes generally about Sophocles that  
he explores time and again the destinies of human beings 
who refuse to recognize the limits imposed on the 
individual will by men and gods, and go to death or 
triumph, magnificently defiant to the last.101
As quoted Bernard Knox says that these limits are imposed on the individual will. The 
will is not the same as one’s actions or intentions, for one may act and intend against ones 
will. The limitation spoken of here is therefore one which refers not to freedom of action, but 
rather a restriction of one’s freedom of the will. To formulate this according to the deep-self 
theoreticians we could say that one is prevented from having or being the self which one 
would prefer to be. Limits are imposed between one’s real self and one’s intention. 
To have a limited will is to not be able to intend or conclude in correspondence with 
one’s deep or real self. The concluded will or intentions will then in some sense have been 
decided by the imposed limitations, to the extent that other options have been excluded by the 
restrictions. This is true of the individuals who do recognize the limits imposed on the 
individual by men and gods but is not true of the tragic hero who would rather die than accept 
these limits.  
In order to conceive of the imposition of these recognized limits we must presume that 
the limits enter somewhere between their real selves and their wills. This makes it seem as if 
their deep or real self judges (ideally) without recognition of the spoken of limits. When the 
limits are imposed the concluding intention will be contrary to the (less limited) will of the 
deep or real self. Otherwise the limits would not be imposed. At least not within the deep self 
view of free will. Possibly the limits could also intervene in the formulation of the real self 
but that would not qualify as imposition on the deep self view of free will. 
Antigone differs in that there are no limitations which intervene between the ideal will 
of her real self and the will of her practical or social self. For Antigone the limits which are 
conceded on all levels of herself are the same and they disregard the limits which are imposed 
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on her externally. She therefore seems in some sense unlimited. But the way Williams 
presents character incapacities – which especially refer to the Sophoclean hero – these are 
presented as limits rather than lack of limitations. Following Williams we might see 
Antigone’s action in terms of an incapacity to act contrary to her real self. In that perspective 
the others could perhaps be less limited since they do not let their real selves get in the way of 
obeying the state authority. But it seems indubitable that it is the latter that constitutes the 
limit and that a limit is defined in relation to one’s real self. 
 “We are subject to the model that what one can do sets the limits to deliberation and 
that character is revealed by what one chooses within those limits, among the things one can 
do.”102  
Must and must 
By an incapacity of character Williams means that the agent is incapable of doing that thing 
intentionally. He might very well be able to do it unintentionally. The incapacity might 
consist in the fact that the agent is incapable of thinking of this option, or if he can consider it, 
that he in the end cannot choose it or do it. There are two forms which this kind of incapacity 
may take in deliberation according to Williams. The first occurs when I (believe I) have to do 
a certain thing and consequently cannot do the alternatives. The second case is where I cannot 
conceivably do the other alternatives and so the alternative which remains is the one I must 
do. Williams distinguishes these in terms of whether necessity or impossibility have priority. 
He also admits that “The agent who sincerely says that he cannot do a certain thing, or that he 
must do something else which excludes that thing, cannot mean without qualification”103.  
The first kind of must (when necessity precedes impossibility) may be suitably called a 
positive must, since that which we must is positively motivated for it’s own sake. It may be 
the result of a normative requirement, concluding from an intention and a belief in a necessary 
means that this is what I have to do, if the other alternatives were disqualified before or 
perhaps as an effect preceding its cause that I felt I had to do the option I chose. In that case it 
would neither be something I ought nor must do. Alternatively the must may have been 
encouraged by an ought fact or my belief that something was an ought fact, and I was a 
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person so set on doing what I ought to do that I could not possibly get myself to intend to do 
otherwise. This kind of must may therefore be or correlate with an ought or not. 
The second possibility is insufficient for a must since it is solely a negative must. I do it 
because I cannot do something else. There is always the chance that there are further 
considerations amongst which I may choose, and so the must referred to here cannot be 
anything but the normative requirement which follows from my beliefs that 1) I must do 
either A, B, or C in order to accomplish D and that 2) I cannot do A nor B coupled up with 
my intention to do D which consequently requires of me that I intend to do C. Surely a 
normative requirement differs from a must.  
Williams remarks that must differs from ought in that what I ought to do I may not do, 
and points out that whereas the reprimando you ought to have implies the openness not to do 
what you ought to do, must doesn’t have a past tense. This establishes the existence of 
“significant ambiguities in this area” which lead Williams to claim that “the cannot of 
practical necessity itself introduces a certain kind of incapacity.”104  
Antigone is not restricted by Creon nor the reactive attitudes of the other citizens. She 
can and she does what nobody else can. Surely the others can also bury the corpse, they just 
get can’t themselves to neither do so nor want to do so. They can’t intend it. This might not 
qualify as a character incapacity according to Williams’ description because it is not 
something they choose not to intend or cannot intend within that which they can do. On the 
other hand, they can bury the corpse just as much as Antigone can and so we may construe 
the inability to intend to do so as a character incapacity. Yet I don’t think that would be right 
since their incapacity would cease if Creon permitted it. Against this one may still maintain 
that their character chooses to obey Creon and cannot intend otherwise. Antigone for instance 
cannot obey state authority when she believes it to be wrong. She must do what she deems 
right disregarding what limitations there are to this must. I am going to argue that the cannot 
of practical deliberation sometimes falls within the category of that which can be done 
intentionally and that thereby differs from the incapacities of character.  
Ismene supports her refusal to help Antigone by voicing her (supposed) inability to do 
so which is defended by a certain belief in destiny and the limitations of her power, “we’re 
underlings, ruled by much stronger hands, so we must submit to this, and things still 
worse.”105 “if things have come to this, who am I to make or mend them”.106  
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 In order to decide whether the inability to intend contrary to Creon is a character 
incapacity according to Williams’ construal we need to be able to say whether Ismene 
concludes in deliberation that she cannot do this thing or whether deliberation takes place 
within the boundary of this restraint. 
“What I recognise, when I conclude in deliberation that I cannot do a certain thing, is a 
certain incapacity of mine.”107 Are the limits marked by my incapacities restraints on my 
freedom or do they express my normative values? “In the serious cases, the notion of 
necessity is applied to those constraints and objectives themselves.”108 The latter notion of 
necessity is taken to apply equally to Antigone and Ismene but I wish to maintain the 
difference between them. The question I want to consider here is whether these restrictions 
limit one’s ability to do that which one ought to do. If the answer is yes, which seems likely, 
then more freedom is tied to a less limited attainment of that which one ought to do. 
Williams’ characterization of the practical ought of our conclusions is that “Of that 
conclusive ought, […], ‘ought’ does imply ‘can’.”109 What a person can do varies, this is why 
Williams also conceives of this practical ought as relative “to the projects, motives, and so on 
of the agent in question.”110 That individuals conclude with different oughts entails that 
people can do different things, and consequently one person can do something another cannot, 
and we are responsible for this as Williams says perhaps more than anything else. But it 
seems to me that this is where some people can do better things than others and be more 
moral than others. And such variations in ought are not relieved by all kinds of cannots. 
Limits 
Kant distinguished between Grensen and Schranke as two different kinds of limits. Whereas 
the latter is transgressable and simply marks how far we have come in some area where it is 
not in principle possible to reach the limit, the former kind of limit is impossible for us to 
surpass.  
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Our practical deliberation is limited in both these ways. There are conditional limits to 
reasoning, such as internalized limits exerted via our values and characteristics in the way 
Hookway describes, and imposed limits, both kinds which can be both of practical and 
epistemological kinds and so on. The unavoidable limits to our reasoning are such as time 
restraints and our limited mental capacities, concerning consciousness, linear thinking and 
memory.  
We are also limited in our morality, both by avoidable and unavoidable limitations, of 
both physical and mental sorts. We are limited as to how moral we are and as to how moral 
we may possibly be. We can therefore formulate three limits within the domain of the moral. 
There is a limit which marks how moral I may be with consideration to individual restraints. 
Secondly there is a limit of possibility which is construed independently of individual 
restraints. This is the limit we most often refer to when we say what is possible and what is 
not. Thirdly there is the unlimited limit which formulates how moral we may possibly be 
disregarding the practical limits which are constitutive of the second limit. This third limit 
may be formulated in terms of hypothetical thinking and we may not be able to conceive of it 
and we usually can’t attain it. This unrestrained formulation of the ought is the reference of 
for instance the claim that I ought to save both drowning people in a situation in which I can 
only save one. Interestingly, the character of this third and ideal ought seems to be essentially 
of the transgressable kind of a limit. The unrestrainedness of its formulation makes it 
conditional upon our ability to visualize what ought to be. The other limits are however 
presented as if they were solid untransgressable limits. Yet they are clearly not, and it is this 
dualism between can and ought which allows us to explain the co-existence of both 
unrestrained and restrained oughts as oughts without having to reduce ought to the ought 
which is limited by practical and other restraints. What distinguishes the second limit from the 
first is that the first is limited by can nots that could be can dos 
 Bernard Williams seems to some extent to conflate the limit of how moral we can be 
with the limit of how moral we actually are, by likening the must which prevents us from 
doing some of the things we could to the must of impossibility which marks the second level. 
The second limit marks how much of what I ought to do I can do and the first limit 
marks how much of the second category (that which I can do of what I ought to do) I do.  
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Susan Wolf defines a moral saint as “a person whose every action is as morally good as 
possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be.”111 A person who is not a 
moral saint could therefore be expected to stop short of doing moral deeds which he could do. 
Can and cannot 
Williams wants to conflate the two cannots that mark the limit of the first and second limit. 
“Why should this kind of cannot be anything other than cannot?”112 “if the agent is right in 
thinking or concluding that he cannot do a certain thing, then […] he will not do it.” This kind 
of incapacity of character is claimed impossible along with real impossibility.  
Sometimes what is possible for one person is not possible for another. There may be 
contingent restrictions such as that one must be able to drive a car or ride a horse or have a 
parachute. Yet the possibility of doing or having these essential traits is nevertheless possible 
for everyone who is not physically or mentally unable to attain such qualifications. The 
cannot is therefore on the individual level rather than the collective, in other words this cannot 
is part of what constitutes the first limit which marks how far one individual has come. And 
yet if I couldn’t save anyone from drowning because I did not know how to swim, something 
I clearly could learn, then I am still frustrated by that restriction as being one which prevented 
me from doing that which I ought to have done. I am not upset with my choice of action 
(presuming I tried the second best option to jumping in). The relation between things which I 
could do yet can’t do is therefore quite complex when it comes to measuring whether I have 
done what I ought to have done. Sometimes I have done all I could even though I did not do 
all I possibly could’ve done (I could possibly have swam if I knew how), so that the level of 
blame and regret is given by the first limit. This shows that there are different relations 
between can and ought, depending on which kind of can we are speaking about which again 
makes the oughts differ. Guilt and blame are contingent upon the first kind of can while ought 
exists independently of this but we only blame people for oughts they could’ve and therefore 
should’ve accomplished.  
The most difficult boundary here is of course limitations provided by individual 
thought. That I can’t swim and don’t have a horse excuse you from blame in a whole other 
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way than cases where you lack a certain belief or intention. This is something which is 
possible for you in the same way and perhaps also requires a certain learning process, an 
active acquisition, yet we tend not to suspend blame when it comes to concerns you should’ve 
taken. That you didn’t know certain facts is usually along the lines of having a car and 
knowing how to swim, it is lack of responsiveness and sensitivity which we blame, and 
sometimes also forgetting, when we liken that to a lack of concern.  
David Lewis makes the correct distinction between the two kinds of can. 
An ape can’t speak a human language – say, Finnish – but 
I can. Facts about the anatomy and operation of the ape’s 
larynx and nervous system are not compossible with his 
speaking Finnish. The corresponding facts about my 
larynx and nervous system are compossible with my 
speaking Finnish. But don’t take me along to Helsinki as 
your interpreter: I can’t speak Finnish.113  
Here we see that the first kind of can refers to a possibility and the second kind of can refers 
to a specific measurement of whether this possibility obtains. The significant difference to 
Williams is that Williams formulates the difference counterfactually in terms of intention. If I 
can do it unintentionally then it is possible, if I cannot do it unintentionally then it is not 
possible, “what an agent ‘literally’ cannot do […] he cannot do even unintentionally”114 It 
becomes apparent now that Williams’ distinction does not coincide with Lewis’ in significant 
ways. Although Lewis can speak Finnish in the first sense he still cannot do so unintentionally 
in the second sense. If Lewis can’t speak Finnish then he isn’t suddenly going to do so 
unintentionally under hypnosis or torture. We see therefore that Williams’ description of these 
two senses of can is misleadingly formulated in terms of intention so that all kinds of can 
become relative to the agents’ mind states. The possibility of speaking Finnish is on 
Williams’ account an impossibility, something the agent can’t even do unintentionally. The 
problem is that a lot of the things I can’t do unintentionally I could do both intentionally and 
unintentionally if only I had acquired the skills to do so. Consequently Lewis’ category of 
what I can do incorporates both Williams’ category of what I can do unintentionally and what 
I can do intentionally. Lewis category of what I could do overlaps partly with Williams’ 
category of what can’t be done unintentionally as well as what can be done unintentionally. 
The significance of this comparison is that Williams displaces the existence of 
impossibility, and although what you can’t do unintentionally also incorporates the 
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impossible, it also includes a lot of things which you could do if only you knew how or made 
some adjustments to yourself. Likewise what you can do unintentionally refers to both things 
which you possibly could do, and things which you can do, although as we have seen with the 
case of Finnish there are possibilities which it excludes. Likewise what I can do intentionally 
might be if we accept it as the outcome of my practical deliberation, a smaller category than 
that which I actually can do, because it is additionally restricted by what I want to do. 
The problem with this is that a contingent cannot becomes an unconditional 
impossibility, something which is clearly wrong, and the reason why Williams confuses it 
with the agent who identifies himself so much with his ideals that he would rather die than not 
do them or do that which opposes them. And since the latter could be done unintentionally, it 
is not as impossible as that which I cannot do in the second sense. This points to a mistake in 
Williams’ construction of these distinctions. 
Williams also includes that we cannot think of into the category of character 
incapacities, “thinking that something is unthinkable is not so direct a witness to its being 
unthinkable as is being incapable of thinking of it.”115 Now there are several ways in which an 
agent may be incapable of thinking of something and different kinds and perhaps degrees of 
incapacity. Generally I agree with Christopher Hookway in that which questions occur to us 
and which do not “reflects our epistemic values, and we can surely be held responsible for at 
least some failings in their operation.”116 Hookway bases his account on “common and 
distinctive cases where salience is seen as an expression of one’s own normative 
standards.”117 In such cases what one does not think of is quite on the contrary of an 
incapacity rather a normative choice made on the basis of one’s internalized values. This 
shows that that which does not occur to us may be an expression of our normative values. 
Hookway maintains that the exclusions which are facilitated by our internalizations are 
necessary in order for deliberation to come to a close and to be able to result in action. “unless 
we have mastered such normative standards in the form of habits and skills, we will be unable 
to exercise the deliberative capacities that are required for effective actions. Too many 
questions arise – possibly indefinitely many – and deliberation could never come to a 
close.”118
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Ought and blame 
The limit of the impossible assures me that although I did not do what I ought to have done I 
did all I could’ve done. My regret for not having been able to do all I ought to have done 
shows that ought is not limited by practical restraints, even impossibility. If I could’ve done 
something better by having known something else, by having deliberated differently, or by 
having done something better (as for example if I didn’t succeed in rescuing even one 
drowning person because I didn’t take my boots off before I jumped into the water so that I 
nearly drowned myself, or because I kept closing my eyes because I don’t like to get water in 
my eyes and so I couldn’t find them, then I will feel regret in a whole other way. My 
consolation in not having been able to do anymore than I did shows that it’s acceptable to stop 
at our practical limitations, we don’t demand that we do more than we can. Although we still 
feel that we ought to do more. Bernard Williams formulates this distinction. 
Regret necessarily involves a wish that things had been 
otherwise, for instance that one had not had to act as one 
did. But it does not necessarily involve the wish, all things 
taken together, that one had acted otherwise. An example 
of this […] is offered by the cases of conflict between two 
courses of action each of which is morally required, where 
either course of action, even if it is judged to be for the 
best, leaves regrets – […] agent-regrets about something 
voluntarily done.119
The situation in which I could only save one of two people from drowning is just this kind of 
case. As Bernard Williams says I will wish that things had been otherwise, without wishing 
that I had acted otherwise. There wasn’t any other way for me to act, and that is what I regret. 
I wish the practical limitations had not been there so that I could’ve done something so as to 
rescue both and not have to act in a way which only rescued one of them. But given that I had 
to act in such a way I don’t regret that I did. 
This reveals that blame is determined against the limit of practical possibility while 
ought may incorporate impossibility. 
                                                 
119 Moral Luck p.31 
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Freedom and the real self 
From interventions between one’s real self and one’s practical conclusions we see that the real 
or deep self is a more ideal self which pays less attention to practical limits, and perhaps even 
bases itself on hypothetical states of affairs and other hypothetical premises which imply the 
eradication of contingently existing limits. In that case Antigone is rightfully seen as an 
idealist and is separated from others by having a more ideal will.  
However, according to this construal those who have a practical deep self which is 
constructed in accordance with conventional restrictions and corresponds to their effective 
will are just as free as Antigone. It also seems reasonable concerning limitations that if they 
are recognized they will also be either approved of or seen as necessary and therefore 
conceded by the real self as well. 
We might distinguish Antigone from determined others who’s real self is correlated 
with their effective will by focusing on the ephemeral quality of a conventional real self in the 
manner illustrated by Stepan Arkadyich. Or we could measure the distance between the ideal 
(real) self and the states of affairs that these contrast with to see whether this individual’s real 
self stands in a normative relation to society. The relation could be normative if the individual 
demands more of the world. The individual who demands changes, or ideally wills changes, 
provides normativity, as opposed to individuals who don’t, but rather ideally will that things 
are as they are. The conventional cannot contribute anything novel since they don’t have the 
potential to transgress the limits which constitute that which is, but rather support or 
constitute that which is by having internalized those limits, or by believing them to be 
necessary, so that the existence of those conventions or that society is conditional upon them. 
In order for society’s norms or morality to improve it is essential that we have some 
individuals who don’t recognize imposed limits. Otherwise there would be no source for 
intentional change. Collective reasoning thereby presupposes that some individuals transgress 
conventional limits in their reasoning.
Olav Gjelsvik defines our real self in terms of value since our values are such that we 
cannot value that we don’t value them. “Our valuings thus understood make up the favoured 
set of pro-attitudes, the set that expresses the “real self” in the sense of the motivational 
commitments we cannot distance ourselves from. We are thus to be identified with our 
valuings.”120 This construal of the real self allows us to say that the restriction which prevents 
                                                 
120 Olav Gjelsvik: “Freedom of the Will” p.9 
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the good citizens but not Antigone from doing something we must presume is something one 
ought to do prevents them from doing something they ought to do in a way which also limits 
their freedom. Antigone and Ismene are both presented with the same conflicting oughts, that 
they ought to bury their brother, and that they ought not to bury their brother. On one 
construal of the real self one may say that Ismene as a good citizen is dedicated to obey the 
city law and may be subordinated to a second order volition to make her will the will of the 
city state. That would exclude her from having desires to go against the city law. On the 
account which construes the real self in terms of valuings we may consider the prospects for 
her to value both that she obeys Creon and that her brother is buried. She may value that 
Antigone buries their brother but not be able to value that she does it since she cannot value 
that she goes against Creon. Or we may press the inconsistency which these valuings may 
lead to and claim that she does not really value that she obeys the state law but is as Knox 
says limited in her will by Creon’s restriction so that she cannot have the will she wants to 
have. For her this appears as impossible. 
In order to judge a non-acratic person as either free or determined we need a second 
perspective from which we can see whether this person is behaving determinedly or freely in 
comparison to his surroundings. We need to compare his internal states to external states. To 
say that a non-acratic agent may be either determined or free might be non-sense according to 
the deep self theoreticians but I would like to hold on to the distinction as very roughly 
similar to Habermas’ distinction between conventional and post-conventional moral agents. It 
seems to me that a conventional person is likely to act in accordance to his deep self and yet 
be determined. By that I do not mean determined in the sense of causal explanation which can 
also be applied to a freely-willed person from the causal perspective, but that the perspective 
in which to describe him as free is missing. There is no point of view in which we can see that 
he has employed the kind of choice and value-examination which underlies the having of a 
will, so whether he has freedom of the will remains perhaps evidence-transcendent. I also 
think that this is the only relevant approach to the topic of freedom and determination.  
What we need to distinguish is when we are free and when we are determined and this 
question might have to be put at the level where we formulate our real selves and not at the 
level of acting in accordance with it. The latter approach can after all only diagnose weakness 
of the will, and not a determined will. Having a weak will might be to be determined, but I 
think it is important that we also allow for a diagnosis of will determination in cases where 
one’s effective will does not conflict with one’s ideal will. It is after all quite possible and 
quite common to have a determined ideal will. Frankfurt’s wanton does not seem to be what I 
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am after, since the mark of a determined person may very likely be precisely that he cares 
(most of all) about what kind of a will he has in a way which overrides the ability to desire 
something independently of this and in a way which might oppose his values. He might care 
for example that his will expresses a certain identity or complies to certain rules or groups of 
people. His second-order volitions therefore stand in line with his second-order desires in just 
the way that it does for a free willed person. “What distinguishes the rational wanton from 
other rational agents is that he is not concerned with the desirability of his desires 
themselves.”121 This distinction might or might not be what I want. Frankfurt accentuates the 
rational wanton as one who “ignores the question of what his will is to be” and “does not care 
which of his inclinations is the strongest”122 and that is not a description of what I am after. 
The determined person does care about and consider these questions. The difference is that it 
is in some sense not an option for him to have any other second-order volitions.  
But in order for this kind of argument to have any relevance the impossibility of having 
any other second-order volitions needs to be distinguished substantially from the character 
incapacities which Williams points out. This is because once we have chosen, when we do 
value something, then we cannot also not value it. It might be possible to fix this qualification 
(Gjelsvik’s criterion for one’s real self as consisting in values) into the qualification of having 
second-order volitions and get out the distinction which I want.  
For now we can say that on Frankfurt’s account of the real self Ismene and the other 
good citizens might be considered free because they recognize the limitations Creon imposes 
on them in virtue of having higher desires for obeying state law. We need an account of 
values in order to also formulate that this restriction (also) limits their freedom of the will. 
A last consideration of whether the principle of reasoning could or should 
be more substantial 
If our minds are so limited in comparison to the world, or the world of all possible contents 
and all the correct relations between these, so that we never achieve a perfect state of 
coherence, then perhaps there ought to be further rational restraints on rationality which 
demand that we focus on certain relevant mind states rather than filling our minds up with 
beliefs about the moon being made of green cheese. “It is not reasonable or rational to fill 
your mind with trivial consequences of your beliefs, when you have better things to do with 
                                                 
121 Harry Frankfurt: “Freedom of the Will”, in (ed.) Gary Watson: Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2003, 
pp.322-337, p.328 
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your time, as you often do.”123 This kind of a restraint, Harman’s principle of clutter 
avoidance, would however take the form of a detachable ought and cannot in itself interfere 
with or partake in a normative requirement. Although it may be stronger than a normative 
requirement and may therefore demand that you ought not to satisfy that normative 
requirement but rather focus on more important normative requirements. 
Considering that the principle of a normative requirement defines correct reasoning in 
terms of the satisfaction of normative requirements this theory enables a person who reasons 
very little to qualify as more rational as far as rationality concerns normative requirements, 
since a person who has a greater amount of mind states in his mind and thinks very hard about 
what to cancel and what to keep, and perhaps even makes a little mistake (which could be a 
description of a very bright philosopher), this person might turn out to reason less and worse 
than a man who hardly reasons at all and maybe has so few mind states and so few connective 
mind states that he rarely finds himself in a state he ought not to be in. This makes it seem 
probable that reasoning should be defined on the basis of a positive coherence rather than the 
negative coherence which Broome bases it on, namely that a lack of incoherence is coherence. 
An alternative suggestion of the principle of reasoning might then be made in a manner which 
attaches it somehow to oughts and reasons. This would greatly increase the prospects for the 
strict ought, but it would probably also seem rather contrived. Perhaps this criterion could 
provide an account of reasoning to the best means and even with respect to reasoning to 
necessary means could be a closer assimilation to Aristotle’s amount of most concerns, so that 
which and how many concerns a person has taken plays a role in reasoning. Thereby we could 
approach Wiggins’ interpretation of Aristotle “The man of highest practical wisdom is the 
man who brings to bear upon the situation the greatest number of genuinely pertinent 
concerns and genuinely relevant considerations.”124 But this kind of reasoning would demand 
a substantial ought in the principle of reasoning, and so it seems that it would have to be 
complementary to correct reasoning, in the sense that Aristotle spoke of it as practical 
wisdom. Yet there are substantial restrictions or oughts which do effect our reasoning 
although they are not accounted for within the logic of reasoning. Such as Harman’s demand 
for a restriction on which normative requirements one ought to occupy oneself with, which 
normative requirements one ought to focus on, which seems to be the description of actual 
norms which matter to our reasoning, yet which cannot be accounted for within the 
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124 Wiggins: “Deliberation and Practical Reason”, essay VI in Needs, Values, Truth, Aristotelian Society Series 
Vol.6, Oxford, 1987, p.225 
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formalistic norms of reasoning. Such norms would then again need the same responsiveness 
towards them which ought facts need.  
For Wiggins’ reading of Aristotle “the greatest number of pertinent concerns” is tied to 
the formulation and solution of a higher goal. The fact that we search for the best 
specification of the goal and the best means to it is what constitutes our freedom as well as 
our practical reasoning. “The unfinished or indeterminate character of our ideals and value 
structure is constitutive both of human freedom and […] of practical rationality itself.”125 If 
there is no evaluation and elaboration of the higher goal, as when this is determined by 
convention or law, then freedom is also restricted, and so is our ability to do that which we 
ought to do. 
Conclusion 
What has been at stake here is the contingency of the strict ought to the particularities of the 
situation and also to the subjective elements involved in how and what we see in the situation. 
In other words, there are two main kinds of contingencies, two kinds of restraints imposed on 
oughts. One is provided by the way things are, how particular situations in our spacio-
temporal reality are limited and unideal. The other restraint is our minds. These contingencies 
seem to prevent us from finding ideal solutions and from having uncomplicated relations to 
ought. Ought facts seem to collide and to change from one situation to another. Every ought 
appears to be essentially adjustable, at least over time, since we in reality have to deal with 
flexible ought facts which sometimes are more or less important than other ought facts. When 
oughts conflict they are treated as gradable and reducible ougths, not as strict oughts. Failure 
to act in accordance with one ought is seen as justified in relation to another ought. In some 
cases this seems right in others it does not.  
The fact that morality may demand more than we can do does not excuse us from 
trying. The significance of this is that if we deduce from the fact that we cannot satisfy all 
moral demands that we ought not to satisfy all moral demands, then we are cancelling 
morality (or let’s just say ought) in its general nature. It is essential to normativity that it 
exists independently of that which is, that it always demands more. When a goal is attained, 
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we aim to improve on that which is attained. Perfection is never attained. Williams, Wolf and 
Catherine Wilson all try to remove this normative demand which is always ahead of us by 
lowering normativity to that which is.  
I have in some ways considered the prospects for a strict ought. My last words will be 
that the debate about morality and the moral ought must be supplemented by a focus on other 
aspects of persons. Normative requirements are enforced or protected by correct reasoning 
which holds a high status. Ought facts and reasons are however not discussed in relation to 
some other faculty of our rationality or morality which enforce and protect their power. In 
deciding between two horrors imagination should get us out of having to make a bad decision 
by providing another option and sensitivity to the concerns of others should prevent us from 
doing things we ought not to do. More imagination and sensitivity make us less limited, more 
free, and more as we ought to be. 
In order for the moral ought, or any strict ought, such as is provided by matters of 
justice, to gain its right status in relation to other ‘oughts’, and other normative forces, the 
capacities which underlie our responsiveness to the ought facts must gain a proper status in 
relation to rationality and the other constituents of rationality, if we conceive of it as one of 
the normative forces of rationality as Broome does. 
 72 
 
Bibliography 
Anscombe, G.E.M.: “Modern Moral Philosophy” ch.1 in (ed.)Roger Crisp and Michael Slote: 
Virtue Ethics, Oxford University Press 2003, pp.26-45 
Anscombe, G.E.M: Intention, Harvard University Press 2000 
Broome, John: “Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable 
values”, in Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier, edited by 
Christopher Morris and Arthur Ripstein, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 98–120. 
Broome, John: “Normative Practical Reasoning”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volume 75 (2001), pp. 175–93. 
Broome, John: “Normative Requirements”, ch.4 in (ed.) Jonathan Dancy: Normativity, 
Blackwell 2000, This and the following Broome articles to be found at 
john.broome@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
Broome, John: “Practical Reasoning”, in Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of 
Rationality, edited by José Bermùdez and Alan Millar, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 
85–111. 
Broome, John: “Reasons”, in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of 
Joseph Raz, edited by Jay Wallace, Michael Smith, Samuel Scheffler and Philip Pettit, Oxford 
University Press, 2004. pp. 28–55. 
Dancy, Jonathan: “Editor’s Introduction” to Normativity, Blackwell 2000, pp.vii-xv 
Dancy, Jonathan: Practical Reality, Oxford University Press 2004 
Dolan, John M. : “G. E. M. Anscombe: Living the Truth” First Things 113 (May 2001): 11-
13, at www.firstthings.com 
Foot, Philippa: “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” ch.XI in Virtues and 
Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosphy, Clarendon Press Oxford, pp.157-173 
Frankfurt, Harry: “Freedom of the Will”, in (ed.) Gary Watson: Free Will, Oxford University 
Press, 2003, pp.322-337 
Gjelsvik, Olav: “Freedom of the Will” 
1 
Harman, Gilbert: Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind Oxford University Press 1999 
Harman, Gilbert: “The Significance of Sense: Meaning, Modality, and Morality”, Book 
Review in “The Philosophical Review”, Vol. 82, No. 2 (April 1973), pp.235-239 
Harman, Gilbert: The Nature of Morality Oxford University Press 1977 
Hookway, Christopher: “Epistemic Norms and Theoretical Deliberation”, in (ed.) Jonathan 
Dancy: Normativity, Blackwell 2000, pp.60-77 
Jackson, Frank: “Non-cognitivism, Normativity, Belief”, ch.5 in (ed.) Jonathan Dancy: 
Normativity, Blackwell 2000, pp.100-115 
Lewis, David: “The Paradoxes of Time Travel” in Philosophical Papers Vol. II, 
Lewis, David: Convention, Blackwell 2002 
McDowell, John: “Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle’s Ethics” in (ed.) 
Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness 
and Duty, Cambridge UP 1996, pp.19-35 
Pettit, Philip and Michael Smith: “Freedom in Belief and Desire”, essay nr.20 in (ed.) Gary 
Watson: Free Will 2.ed., OUP, 2003, pp.388-408 
Railton, Peter: “Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, but not Hume 
versus Kant”, 1.ch. in (ed) Jonathan Dancy: Normativity, Blackwell 2000, pp.1-33 
Raz, Joseph: Engaging Reason, Oxford University Press 1999 
Sophocles: Antigone, The Three Theban Plays Antigone, Oedipus The King, Oedipus at 
Colonus, translated by Robert Fagles, Penguin Classics 1984 
Tolstoy, Leo: Anna Karenina, Penguin Classics 2003 
Wiggins: “Deliberation and Practical Reason”, essay VI in Needs, Values, Truth, Aristotelian 
Society Series Vol.6, Oxford, 1987 
Williams, Bernard: Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1999 
Wilson, Catherine: Moral Animals, Clarendon Press Oxford, 2004 
Wolf, Susan: “Moral Saints”, ch.4 in (ed.) Roger Crisp and Michael Slote: Virtue Ethics, 
Oxford University Press 1997, pp.79-98 
 
 2 
 
  3 
 
